单一可转移投票的可操作性
Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote
摘要:
对于许多投票规则,计算成功的操纵是NP-难的。然而,NP-困难仅限制了最坏情况的复杂性。最近的理论结果表明,操纵在实践中往往是容易的。我们实证研究操纵单一可转移投票(STV)规则的成本。这是第一个被证明是NP难操作的规则之一。它似乎也是更难操纵的规则之一,因为它涉及多轮,而且与许多其他规则不同,单个代理在没有投票权重或不确定其他代理如何投票的情况下操纵是NP困难的。在我们的实验中,几乎每一次选举都很容易计算出单个代理人如何操纵选举,或者证明单个代理人的操纵是不可能的。它仍然是一个有趣的开放式问题,如果操纵联盟的代理是很难计算在实践中。
英文摘要:
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically the cost of manipulating the single transferable vote (STV) rule. This was one of the first rules shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. It also appears to be one of the harder rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds and since, unlike many other rules, it is NP-hard for a single agent to manipulate without weights on the votes or uncertainty about how the other agents have voted. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible. It remains an interesting open question if manipulation by a coalition of agents is hard to compute in practice.
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