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arXiv 1812.10754cs.CR
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不完全信息攻击树的属性评价

Attribute Evaluation on Attack Trees with Incomplete Information

Ahto Buldas, Olga Gadyatskaya, Aleksandr Lenin, Sjouke Mauw, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua

摘要:

攻击树被认为是安全建模的有用工具,因为它们支持定性和定量分析。定量方法基于与树中每个节点相关联的值,例如,表示攻击的最小成本或概率。目前的攻击树的定量方法允许分析师,基于初始分配的值的叶节点,推导出的值的树中的较高的节点。然而,在实践中,很难获得所有叶节点的可靠值。主要原因是数据仅可用于某些节点,数据可用于中间结点而不是叶节点,或者甚至可用数据不一致。我们解决这些问题,通过开发一个概括的标准自下而上的计算方法在三个方面。首先,我们允许非叶子节点的初始属性。其次,我们承认额外的攻击步骤之间的关系超出了那些提供的基础攻击树语义。第三,我们支持在不一致的情况下近似解的计算。我们说明了我们的方法,这是基于约束规划,通过一个全面的案例研究。

英文摘要:

Attack trees are considered a useful tool for security modelling because they support qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach is based on values associated to each node in the tree, expressing, for instance, the minimal cost or probability of an attack. Current quantitative methods for attack trees allow the analyst to, based on an initial assignment of values to the leaf nodes, derive the values of the higher nodes in the tree. In practice, however, it shows to be very difficult to obtain reliable values for all leaf nodes. The main reasons are that data is only available for some of the nodes, that data is available for intermediate nodes rather than for the leaf nodes, or even that the available data is inconsistent. We address these problems by developing a generalisation of the standard bottom-up calculation method in three ways. First, we allow initial attributions of non-leaf nodes. Second, we admit additional relations between attack steps beyond those provided by the underlying attack tree semantics. Third, we support the calculation of an approximative solution in case of inconsistencies. We illustrate our method, which is based on constraint programming, by a comprehensive case study.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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