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arXiv 1902.06414cs.CR
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基于有界噪声的泄漏控制算法的平均攻击

Averaging Attacks on Bounded Noise-based Disclosure Control Algorithms

Hassan Jameel Asghar, Dali Kaafar

摘要:

我们描述并评估了一种攻击,该攻击重建敏感数据集的任何目标属性的直方图,这些数据集只能通过特定一类现实世界的隐私保护算法(我们称之为有界扰动算法)来查询。这种算法的一个定义属性是,它通过添加分布在有界(可能未公开)范围内的零均值噪声来扰乱查询的答案。该算法的其他关键属性包括仅允许受限查询(通过在线界面强制执行),抑制仅由一小群个体满足的查询的答案(例如,通过返回零作为答案),以及将相同的扰动添加到由相同的个体集合满足的两个查询(以阻止差分或平均攻击)。这种算法的一个现实世界的例子是澳大利亚统计局(ABS)在线工具TableBuilder部署的一个算法,它允许用户创建澳大利亚人口普查数据的表格,图表和地图。我们假设一个攻击者(比如一个好奇的分析师)通过一个接口获得了对算法的访问权限。我们描述了两个攻击的算法。这两种攻击都是基于仔细构造(不同的)查询,评估相同的答案。第一次攻击找到隐藏的扰动参数$r$(如果假设它不是公共知识)。第二次攻击去除噪声以获得一些(计数)查询的原始答案。我们还展示了如何使用这种攻击来找到数据集中具有任何属性$A$的目标属性值$a$的个体的数量,然后针对所有属性值$a_i \in A$。我们的攻击实际上说明了信息恢复的(非正式)基本定律,即“对太多统计数据的过度准确估计完全破坏了隐私”。

英文摘要:

We describe and evaluate an attack that reconstructs the histogram of any target attribute of a sensitive dataset which can only be queried through a specific class of real-world privacy-preserving algorithms which we call bounded perturbation algorithms. A defining property of such an algorithm is that it perturbs answers to the queries by adding zero-mean noise distributed within a bounded (possibly undisclosed) range. Other key properties of the algorithm include only allowing restricted queries (enforced via an online interface), suppressing answers to queries which are only satisfied by a small group of individuals (e.g., by returning a zero as an answer), and adding the same perturbation to two queries which are satisfied by the same set of individuals (to thwart differencing or averaging attacks). A real-world example of such an algorithm is the one deployed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) online tool called TableBuilder, which allows users to create tables, graphs and maps of Australian census data [30]. We assume an attacker (say, a curious analyst) who is given oracle access to the algorithm via an interface. We describe two attacks on the algorithm. Both attacks are based on carefully constructing (different) queries that evaluate to the same answer. The first attack finds the hidden perturbation parameter $r$ (if it is assumed not to be public knowledge). The second attack removes the noise to obtain the original answer of some (counting) query of choice. We also show how to use this attack to find the number of individuals in the dataset with a target attribute value $a$ of any attribute $A$, and then for all attribute values $a_i \in A$. Our attacks are a practical illustration of the (informal) fundamental law of information recovery which states that ``overly accurate estimates of too many statistics completely destroys privacy'' [9, 15].

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