We describe and evaluate an attack that reconstructs the histogram of any target attribute of a sensitive dataset which can only be queried through a specific class of real-world privacy-preserving algorithms which we call bounded perturbation algorithms. A defining property of such an algorithm is that it perturbs answers to the queries by adding zero-mean noise distributed within a bounded (possibly undisclosed) range. Other key properties of the algorithm include only allowing restricted queries (enforced via an online interface), suppressing answers to queries which are only satisfied by a small group of individuals (e.g., by returning a zero as an answer), and adding the same perturbation to two queries which are satisfied by the same set of individuals (to thwart differencing or averaging attacks). A real-world example of such an algorithm is the one deployed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics' (ABS) online tool called TableBuilder, which allows users to create tables, graphs and maps of Australian census data [30]. We assume an attacker (say, a curious analyst) who is given oracle access to the algorithm via an interface. We describe two attacks on the algorithm. Both attacks are based on carefully constructing (different) queries that evaluate to the same answer. The first attack finds the hidden perturbation parameter $r$ (if it is assumed not to be public knowledge). The second attack removes the noise to obtain the original answer of some (counting) query of choice. We also show how to use this attack to find the number of individuals in the dataset with a target attribute value $a$ of any attribute $A$, and then for all attribute values $a_i \in A$. Our attacks are a practical illustration of the (informal) fundamental law of information recovery which states that ``overly accurate estimates of too many statistics completely destroys privacy'' [9, 15].
Detile: Fine-Grained Information Leak Detection in Script Engines
内存泄漏攻击在利用内存损坏漏洞方面发挥着重要作用。通过分析最近的研究,我们观察到,绕过强制控制流完整性或尝试检测面向返回的编程的防御性解决方案需要将内存泄露攻击作为基本的第一步。然而,在检测此类信息泄漏方面的研究滞后。在本文中,我们解决了这个问题,并提出了一个细粒度的,自动检测的内存泄漏攻击脚本引擎的系统。基本观点如下:脚本语言,如Web浏览器中的JavaScript,是严格沙箱化的。他们必须不提供任何关于其上下文中的内存布局的见解。事实上,任何此类信息都可能代表正在进行的内存泄露攻击。因此,为了检测信息泄漏,我们的系统创建了一个克隆的脚本引擎进程与重新随机化的内存布局。克隆被检测为与原始进程同步。当执行内存泄漏以泄漏有关内存布局的信息时,两个进程的脚本上下文中会出现任何不一致。基于这种检测方法,我们已经设计并实现了Detile(\underline{i}信息\underline{le} aks的\underline{det}部分),在Windows 8.0/8.1上的Microsoft Internet Explorer 10/11中的JavaScript引擎的原型。实证评估表明,我们的工具可以成功地检测内存泄漏攻击,即使对这个专有软件。
On the Impact of Uncertainty and Calibration on Likelihood-Ratio Membership Inference Attacks
Beijing Key Laboratory of Network System Architecture and Convergence, School of Information and Communication Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(北京网络系统架构与融合重点实验室,信息与通信工程学院,北京邮电大学);King’s Communications, Learning & Information Processing (KCLIP) lab, Department of Engineering, King’s College London(国王学院通讯、学习与信息处理(KCLIP)实验室,工程学院,伦敦国王学院)
PrivScope: Task-scoped Disclosure Control for Hybrid Agentic Systems
Rochester Institute of Technology(罗切斯特理工学院);University of Colorado Denver(科罗拉多大学丹佛分校);Texas A&M University(德克萨斯大学阿姆斯特朗分校);University of Massachusetts Lowell(马萨诸塞大学洛厄尔分校)
School of Computer and Communication Sciences, EPFL(洛桑联邦理工学院计算机与通信科学学院);Université de Lille(里尔大学);Inria(法国国家信息与自动化研究所);CNRS(法国国家科学研究中心);Centrale Lille(里尔中央理工学院);Inria, Univ Montpellier(法国国家信息与自动化研究所、蒙彼利埃大学)
Confuse the Model, Control the Flow: Understanding and Mitigating Privacy Leakage from LLM Agents with Information Flow Control
University of California, Irvine(加州大学欧文分校);University of California, Santa Cruz(加州大学圣克鲁兹分校);University of California, Davis(加州大学戴维斯分校);University of California, Santa Barbara(加州大学圣巴巴拉分校)
Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
Gunn-Allison-Abbott(GAA)最近的一篇论文[L. J. Gunn等人,Scientific Reports 4(2014)6461]认为基尔霍夫定律-约翰逊噪声(KLJN)安全密钥交换系统可能经历严重的信息泄漏。在这里,我们反驳他们的结果,并证明GAA的论点随之而来的一个严重的设计缺陷,在他们的系统。具体地,衰减器将单个基尔霍夫环路分成两个耦合环路,这是不正确的操作,因为单个环路对于KLJN系统中的安全性是必不可少的,因此GAA声称的信息泄漏是微不足道的。另一个后果是,一个完全防御的KLJN系统将无法正常工作,因为它内置了针对主动(入侵)攻击的电流比较防御。在本文中,我们破解GAA的计划通过一个基本的电流比较攻击,产生可以忽略不计的错误概率夏娃,即使没有平均的相关时间的噪声。