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arXiv 1812.00849econ.TH
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战略上简单的机制

Strategically Simple Mechanisms

Tilman Borgers, Jiangtao Li

摘要:

我们定义和调查的机制,我们称之为“战略简单性”,这是为了捕捉的想法,在战略简单的机制,战略选择需要有限的战略复杂性。我们定义一个机制是战略上简单的,如果选择可以基于一阶信念的其他代理人的偏好和一阶确定性的其他代理人的合理性,并没有必要为代理人形成高阶的信念,因为这样的信念是无关紧要的最佳策略。所有的占优策略机制在策略上都是简单的。但更多的机制在战略上是简单的。特别是在双边贸易问题和投票问题中,策略简单机制可能比占优策略机制更灵活。

英文摘要:

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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