战略类比机制
Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
AI总结:
本文研究战略理解在不同机制间的转移条件,提出基于收益比较的知识表示框架,证明在战略等价机制中,通过动作对应关系可实现均衡理解的转移,并定义更弱的战略类比概念,展示其在拍卖和定价等应用中的有效性。
摘要:
本文研究战略理解在不同机制间的转移条件。我们引入一个框架,将代理的知识表示为他们可以进行的收益比较集合,并用此框架正式定义理解策略集为均衡的意义。我们首先将此框架应用于战略等价机制(即通过动作重标号共享相同游戏形式)并显示,一旦相关动作对应关系被解释给代理,他们的均衡理解会跨这些机制转移。我们然后定义战略类比,这是一种更弱的概念,允许不仅动作还允许类型被重新映射,并显示一旦代理认识到动作和类型之间的对应关系,均衡理解会跨战略类比机制转移。应用包括单项目拍卖、评分拍卖和有容量限制的非线性定价。
英文摘要:
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. It introduces a framework in which agents have a limited understanding of how actions affect payoffs, and formalizes how they use analogies to transfer this understanding between mechanisms. We ask when such reasoning allows agents to transfer their understanding of equilibrium between mechanisms. We first consider mechanisms that are strategically equivalent---that is, share the same game form up to relabeling of actions---and show that agents' understanding of equilibrium transfers once they recognize how the actions in these mechanisms map to one another. We then define strategic analogy, a weaker notion that allows actions and types to be remapped, and show that equilibrium understanding transfers once agents recognize how the actions and types in these mechanisms relate. Applications include single-item auctions, scoring auctions, and nonlinear pricing with capacity constraints.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。