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arXiv 2512.09129econ.THcs.GT
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无需先验信息的采购:一种简单的机制及其显著表现

Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance

Yale University(耶鲁大学);Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院)

Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris

AI总结:

本文提出一种无需先验信息的简单采购机制,通过共享买家效用与卖家的比例,确保在所有成本情况下实现正的社会剩余,并通过合理选择比例最大化剩余比。

摘要:

当供应商的成本未知且买家没有先验信念时,买家应如何设计采购机制?我们证明,简单的机制——将买家的效用与卖家共享固定比例——允许买家在所有可能的成本情况下实现保证的正效率社会剩余比例。此外,基于已知需求合理选择共享比例,可以最大化在所有可能(任意复杂和非线性)机制和成本函数下可实现的剩余比。类似的结果也适用于相关非线性定价和最优监管问题。

英文摘要:

How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller - allow the buyer to realize a guaranteed positive fraction of the efficient social surplus across all possible costs. Moreover, a judicious choice of the share based on the known demand maximizes the surplus ratio guarantee that can be attained across all possible (arbitrarily complex and nonlinear) mechanisms and cost functions. Similar results hold in related nonlinear pricing and optimal regulation problems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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