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arXiv 1807.08253cs.GT
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具有财务约束买方的组合交易中的竞争均衡:计算难度和数学解

Competitive Equilibria in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers:Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

Martin Bichler, Stefan Waldherr

摘要:

计算优化的进步允许组织大型组合市场。我们的目标是分配和竞争性均衡价格,即核心的结果。这项研究的动机是设计的环境市场,但类似的问题出现在能源和物流市场或在机场时隙的分配。预算限制是许多这些市场的一个重要问题。虽然在组合交易所的分配问题已经是NP-难与收益最大化的投标人,我们发现,分配和定价问题变得甚至$Σ_2^p$ -硬,如果买家的财务约束。我们引入混合整数双层线性规划(MIBLP)来计算核心价格,并提出了基于最小核心的定价函数,如果核心是空的。我们还讨论了限制,但更简单的情况下,有效的计算技术的问题。在数值实验中,我们表明,尽管这些问题的计算难度,我们可以希望解决实际问题的大小,特别是如果我们限制的核心计算中考虑的联盟的大小。

英文摘要:

Advances in computational optimization allow for the organization of large combinatorial markets. We aim for allocations and competitive equilibrium prices, i.e. outcomes that are in the core. The research is motivated by the design of environmental markets, but similar problems appear in energy and logistics markets or in the allocation of airport time slots. Budget constraints are an important concern in many of these markets. While the allocation problem in combinatorial exchanges is already NP-hard with payoff- maximizing bidders, we find that the allocation and pricing problem becomes even $Σ_2^p$-hard if buyers are financially constrained. We introduce mixed integer bilevel linear programs (MIBLP) to compute core prices, and propose pricing functions based on the least core if the core is empty. We also discuss restricted but simpler cases and effective computational techniques for the problem. In numerical experiments we show that in spite of the computational hardness of these problems, we can hope to solve practical problem sizes, in particular if we restrict the size of the coalitions considered in the core computations.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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