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arXiv 1801.01203cs.CR
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Spectre攻击:利用投机执行

Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution

Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, Yuval Yarom

摘要:

现代处理器使用分支预测和推测执行来最大化性能。例如,如果分支的目的地取决于正在读取的内存值,CPU将尝试猜测目的地并尝试提前执行。当内存值最终到达时,CPU要么放弃,要么提交推测计算。推测逻辑在执行时是不忠实的,可以访问受害者的内存和寄存器,并且可以执行具有可测量副作用的操作。Spectre攻击涉及诱导受害者推测性地执行在正确的程序执行期间不会发生的操作,并且通过侧通道将受害者的机密信息泄露给对手。本文介绍了实际的攻击,结合方法从侧信道攻击,故障攻击,并返回导向的编程,可以读取任意内存从受害者的进程。更广泛地说,该文件表明,投机性执行的实现违反了安全假设的基础上的许多软件安全机制,包括操作系统的进程分离,静态分析,容器化,即时(JIT)编译,并采取对策,高速缓存定时/侧信道攻击。这些攻击对实际系统构成了严重威胁,因为在数十亿设备中使用的英特尔、AMD和ARM的微处理器中发现了易受攻击的推测执行功能。虽然在某些情况下可以采取临时的特定于处理器的对策,但合理的解决方案将需要修复处理器设计以及更新指令集架构(ISA),以便让硬件架构师和软件开发人员对CPU实现允许(和不允许)泄漏的计算状态达成共识。

英文摘要:

Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally arrives, the CPU either discards or commits the speculative computation. Speculative logic is unfaithful in how it executes, can access to the victim's memory and registers, and can perform operations with measurable side effects. Spectre attacks involve inducing a victim to speculatively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side channel to the adversary. This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process. More broadly, the paper shows that speculative execution implementations violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms, including operating system process separation, static analysis, containerization, just-in-time (JIT) compilation, and countermeasures to cache timing/side-channel attacks. These attacks represent a serious threat to actual systems, since vulnerable speculative execution capabilities are found in microprocessors from Intel, AMD, and ARM that are used in billions of devices. While makeshift processor-specific countermeasures are possible in some cases, sound solutions will require fixes to processor designs as well as updates to instruction set architectures (ISAs) to give hardware architects and software developers a common understanding as to what computation state CPU implementations are (and are not) permitted to leak.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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