Cats vs. Spectre:一种推测执行攻击的公理化建模方法
Cats vs. Spectre: An Axiomatic Approach to Modeling Speculative Execution Attacks
摘要:
Spectre家族的投机执行攻击需要重新思考安全的形式化方法。基于操作推测语义的方法已经在寻找易受攻击的代码和验证防御方面取得了初步进展。然而,随着每一次新的攻击,必须集成到底层语义中的微体系结构细节的数量也会增加。我们提出了一种替代的,轻量级的和公理化的方法来指定投机语义,依赖于内存模型的并发性的见解。我们使用CAT建模语言的内存一致性,指定执行模型,捕捉投机控制流,存储到加载转发,预测存储转发,和内存排序机器清除。我们提出了一个有界的模型检验框架参数化我们的投机CAT模型和评估其实现对国家的art.Due的公理化的方法,我们的模型可以迅速扩展,使我们的框架,以检测新类型的攻击,并验证对他们的防御。
英文摘要:
The Spectre family of speculative execution attacks have required a rethinking of formal methods for security. Approaches based on operational speculative semantics have made initial inroads towards finding vulnerable code and validating defenses. However, with each new attack grows the amount of microarchitectural detail that has to be integrated into the underlying semantics. We propose an alternative, light-weight and axiomatic approach to specifying speculative semantics that relies on insights from memory models for concurrency. We use the CAT modeling language for memory consistency to specify execution models that capture speculative control flow, store-to-load forwarding, predictive store forwarding, and memory ordering machine clears. We present a bounded model checking framework parametrized by our speculative CAT models and evaluate its implementation against the state of the art. Due to the axiomatic approach, our models can be rapidly extended to allow our framework to detect new types of attacks and validate defenses against them.
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