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arXiv 1710.00319cs.GT
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众筹游戏

The Crowdfunding Game

Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky

摘要:

最近成功的众筹支持新的和创新的产品已经压倒了超过34十亿美元在2015年提出。在许多众筹平台中,公司设置了一个活动门槛,只有达到这个门槛才能收集捐款。在活动期间,消费者不确定产品的事后价值、商业模式的可行性和卖家的可靠性。承诺捐款的消费者因此赌博。这场赌博受到竞选门槛的影响。只有当更多的代理商认为报价可以接受时,才会收集对具有更高阈值的活动的贡献。因此,高门槛作为一种社会保险,因此在高门槛运动中,潜在的缴款人更容易缴款。我们介绍了众筹游戏,并探讨了贡献者的困境的背景下,体验商品。我们讨论了均衡的存在和相关的社会福利,信息聚合和收入的影响。

英文摘要:

The recent success of crowdfunding for supporting new and innovative products has been overwhelming with over 34 Billion Dollars raised in 2015. In many crowdfunding platforms, firms set a campaign threshold and contributions are collected only if this threshold is reached. During the campaign, consumers are uncertain as to the ex-post value of the product, the business model viability, and the seller's reliability. Consumer who commit to a contribution therefore gambles. This gamble is effected by the campaign's threshold. Contributions to campaigns with higher thresholds are collected only if a greater number of agents find the offering acceptable. Therefore, high threshold serves as a social insurance and thus in high-threshold campaigns, potential contributors feel more at ease with contributing. We introduce the crowdfunding game and explore the contributor's dilemma in the context of experience goods. We discuss equilibrium existence and related social welfare, information aggregation and revenue implications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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