We address the relation between two apparently distinct problems: The quest for a deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness and the search for time and space as emergent structures in the quantum mechanical world. We also advance a toy-model proposal of emergence of time from a timeless unus mundus quantum-like space by using Aharonov's two state formalism of quantum mechanics. We further speculate on these issues within a quantum cognitive perspective with particular interest in two recent papers on this emerging field of science. One (Aerts et al) entails (as we argue) a panpsychist top-down approach to the problem of consciousness. The second paper (Blutner et al) proposes a quantum cognitive model for Jung's psychological type structure. We discuss these concepts and their relation with our main thesis, that time is a measure of individuality. One of our central motivations is to provide arguments that allows the mainstream physicist to take seriously a panpsychist worldview, a position that has been openly forwarded by many modern philosophers.
The assertion by Yu and Nikolic that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al. empirically falsifies the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis of quantum mechanics is based on the unfounded and false assumption that the failure of a quantum wave function to collapse implies the appearance of a visible interference pattern.
Ever since the early days of quantum mechanics it has been suggested that consciousness could be linked to the collapse of the wave function. However, no detailed account of such an interplay is usually provided. In this paper we present an objective collapse model (a variation of CSL) where the collapse operator depends on integrated information, which has been argued to measure consciousness. By doing so, we construct an empirically adequate scheme in which superpositions of conscious states are dynamically suppressed. Unlike other proposals in which "consciousness causes the collapse of the…
In this paper we examine some proposals to disprove the hypothesis that the interaction between mind and matter causes the collapse of the wave function, showing that such proposals are fundamentally flawed. We then describe a general experimental setup retaining the key features of the ones examined, and show that even a more general case is inadequate to disprove the mind-matter collapse hypothesis. Finally, we use our setup provided to argue that, under some reasonable assumptions about consciousness, such hypothesis is unfalsifiable.
Edited proceedings of an interdisciplinary symposium on consciousness held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. The purpose of the Cambridge conference was to encourage distinguished scientists to express their views on the relationship of conscious experience to the physical world.
This paper aims to falsify the hypothesis that the observer's consciousness is necessary for quantum measurement. To achieve our target, we propose a variation of the Schroedinger's cat thought experiment called "DAP", short for "Dead-Alive Physicist", in which a human being replaces the cat. This strategy enables us to logically disprove the consistency of the above hypothesis and to oblige its supporters either to be trapped in solipsism or to rely on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the role of the conscious observer has to be reviewed. Our analysis hence provides…
The hard problem in consciousness is the problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to subjective conscious experience. In this paper, I suggest that in order to understand the relationship between consciousness and the physical world, we need to probe deeply into the nature of physical reality. This leads us to quantum physics and to a second explanatory gap: that between quantum and classical reality. I will seek a philosophical framework that can address these two gaps simultaneously. Our analysis of quantum mechanics will naturally lead us to the notion of…
As time advances in our perceived real world, existing information is preserved and new information is added to history. All the information that may ever be encoded in history must be about some fundamental, unique, atemporal and pre-physical structure: the bare world. Scientists invent model worlds to efficiently explain aspects of the real world. This paper explores the features of and relationships between the bare, real, and model worlds. Time -- past, present and future -- is naturally explained. Both quantum uncertainty and state reduction are needed for time to progress, since unpredic…
The validity of the assertion that some recent double-slit interference experiments, conducted by Radin et al., would have tested the possible role of the experimenter's mind in the collapse of the quantum wave function, is questioned. It is emphasized that quantum mechanics doesn't need any psychophysical ingredient to explain the measurement processes, and therefore parapsychologists shouldn't resort to the latter to support the possibility of psychokinesis, but search for more convincing explanations.
I contemplate the idea that the subjective world and quantum state reductions are one and the same. If true, this resolves with one stroke both the quantum mechanical measurement problem and the hard problem of consciousness.
Institute for Systems Biology（系统生物学研究所）；Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna（博洛尼亚大学）；European Centre for Living Technology（欧洲生命技术中心）
We approach the question "What is Consciousness?" in a new way, not as Descartes' "systematic doubt", but as how organisms find their way in their world. Finding one's way involves finding possible uses of features of the world that might be beneficial or avoiding those that might be harmful. "Possible uses of X to accomplish Y" are "Affordances". The number of uses of X is indefinite (or unknown), the different uses are unordered, are not listable, and are not deducible from one another. All biological adaptations are either affordances seized by heritable variation and selection or, far fast…
Several philosophical problems arising from the physics of consciousness, including identity, duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, and the Boltzmann Brain problem, hinge on one of the most deeply held but unnecessary convictions of physicalism: the assumption that brain states and their corresponding conscious states can in principle be copied. In this paper I will argue against this assumption by attempting to prove the Unique History Theorem, which states, essentially, that conscious correlations to underlying quantum mechanical measurement events must increase with time an…
Since Descartes' dualism, with his res extensa and res cogitans, six fundamental problems in the philosophy and natural history of mind are these: 1. how does mind act on matter? 2. If mind does not act on matter is mind a mere epiphenomenon? 3. What might be the source of free will? 4. What might be the source of a responsible free will? 5. Why might it have been selectively advantageous to evolve consciousness? 6. What is consciousness? I approach the first five of the above six problems based on two physical postulates. First the mind-brain system is a quantum coherent, but reversibly decoh…
I sketch a line of thought about consciousness and physics that gives some motivation for the hypothesis that conscious observers deviate - perhaps only very subtly and slightly - from quantum dynamics. Although it is hard to know just how much credence to give this line of thought, it does motivate a stronger and more comprehensive programme of quantum experiments involving quantum observers.
A physical approach to qualia and the emergence of conscious observers in qualia space
Center for Mathematical Analysis, Geometry and Dynamical Systems, Department of Mathematics, Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon（数学分析与动力系统中心，数学系，技术高等学院，里斯本大学）
