通过逆向选择方法研究电力定价
An adverse selection approach to power pricing
AI总结:
本文研究了在存在逆向选择的情况下,如何为具有不同需求的消费者设计最优的电力合同。通过主代理问题框架,作者探讨了电力生产成本的特殊结构,并提供了显式的解决方案,证明了最优合同可以是线性或多项式形式,且在竞争者提供的外部选项不一致时,电力供应商应与不同类型的消费者签订合同。
摘要:
我们研究了在存在逆向选择的情况下,如何为具有不同需求的消费者设计最优的电力合同。这个问题是在主代理问题的框架下进行研究的。电力的特殊性质导致了生产成本的非寻常结构,没有规模递减的特性。尽管如此,我们仍然能够为所讨论的问题提供显式的解决方案。最优合同要么是消费量的线性函数,要么是多项式函数。当竞争者提供的外部选项在不同类型的消费者之间不一致时,我们展示了电力供应商应与具有低或高电力需求的消费者签订合同的情况。
英文摘要:
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in presence of adverse selection. The particular features of electricity induce an unusual structure on the production cost, with no decreasing return to scale. We are nevertheless able to provide an explicit solution for the problem at hand. The optimal contracts are either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption. Whenever the outside options offered by competitors are not uniform among the different type of consumers, we exhibit situations where the electricity provider should contract with consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。