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arXiv 1609.06359physics.soc-phcs.SI
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相互依赖网络间的博弈:理性对系统鲁棒性的影响

Game among Interdependent Networks: The Impact of Rationality on System Robustness

Yuhang Fan, Gongze Cao, Shibo He, Jiming Chen, Youxian Sun

摘要:

许多现实世界的系统是由相互依赖的网络组成的。这种网络通常由不同的实体设计和运营,其目的是最大化自己的收益。这些实体在设计自己的网络时存在博弈。在本文中,我们研究的博弈研究如何理性的行为实体影响系统的鲁棒性。我们首先引入一个数学模型来量化不同实体之间的相互作用的回报。然后我们研究了博弈的纳什均衡,并将其与最优社会福利进行了比较。我们揭示了在连续博弈中,只有当每个网络的平均度为常数时,不同实体之间的合作才能达到社会福利最大化。因此,纳什均衡与最优社会福利之间的巨大差距普遍存在。实体的合理性使该制度具有先天不足,甚至在某些情况下极易受到损害。我们分析了两个具体的系统,连续的战略空间和离散的战略空间分别我们的模型。此外,我们发现了一些因素(如削弱相互依赖网络的耦合强度,设计合适的拓扑依赖的系统),有助于减少差距和系统的脆弱性。

英文摘要:

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these entities when designing their own networks. In this paper, we study the game investigating how the rational behaviors of entities impact the system robustness. We first introduce a mathematical model to quantify the interacting payoffs among varying entities. Then we study the Nash equilibrium of the game and compare it with the optimal social welfare. We reveal that the cooperation among different entities can be reached to maximize the social welfare in continuous game only when the average degree of each network is constant. Therefore, the huge gap between Nash equilibrium and optimal social welfare generally exists. The rationality of entities makes the system inherently deficient and even renders it extremely vulnerable in some cases. We analyze our model for two concrete systems with continuous strategy space and discrete strategy space, respectively. Furthermore, we uncover some factors (such as weakening coupled strength of interdependent networks, designing suitable topology dependency of the system) that help reduce the gap and the system vulnerability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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