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arXiv 1609.02596cs.ITcs.GTcs.NImath.IT
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基于Stackelberg博弈的无线网络激励主动缓存机制

A Stackelberg Game for Incentive Proactive Caching Mechanisms in Wireless Networks

Fei Shen, Kenza Hamidouche, Ejder Baştuğ, Mérouane Debbah

摘要:

提出了一种在支持缓存的小小区网络(SCN)中的激励主动缓存机制,以激励内容提供方(CP)参与缓存过程.被认为是由一个单一的移动网络运营商(MNO)和多个CP的网络。MNO旨在定义其向CP收取的价格以使其收益最大化,同时CP竞争以确定它们在MNO的小型基站(SBS)处缓存的文件的数量,以提高它们的用户的服务质量(QoS)。这个问题被公式化为一个Stackelberg游戏,其中一个单一的MNO被认为是领导者和多个CP愿意缓存文件的追随者。将追随者博弈建模为非合作博弈,证明了纳什均衡(NE)的存在性和唯一性。推导了每个CP向MNO请求的存储量对应的NE的封闭表达式。在MNO侧制定优化问题以确定MNO应该向CP收取的最优价格。仿真结果表明,在均衡时,MNO和CP都可以实现一个效用,是高达50%以上的情况下,在价格和存储量的要求任意。

英文摘要:

In this paper, an incentive proactive cache mechanism in cache-enabled small cell networks (SCNs) is proposed, in order to motivate the content providers (CPs) to participate in the caching procedure. A network composed of a single mobile network operator (MNO) and multiple CPs is considered. The MNO aims to define the price it charges the CPs to maximize its revenue while the CPs compete to determine the number of files they cache at the MNO's small base stations (SBSs) to improve the quality of service (QoS) of their users. This problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game where a single MNO is considered as the leader and the multiple CPs willing to cache files are the followers. The followers game is modeled as a non-cooperative game and both the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) are proved. The closed-form expression of the NE which corresponds to the amount of storage each CP requests from the MNO is derived. An optimization problem is formulated at the MNO side to determine the optimal price that the MNO should charge the CPs. Simulation results show that at the equilibrium, the MNO and CPs can all achieve a utility that is up to 50% higher than the cases in which the prices and storage quantities are requested arbitrarily.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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