We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market mechanisms in which participants' trades or wagers influence the market's behavior in a way that leads to accurate predictions, yet no single participant has too much influence over what others are able to observe. We study the possibilities and limitations of such mechanisms using tools from differential privacy. We begin by designing a private one-shot wagering mechanism in which bettors specify a belief about the likelihood of a future event and a corresponding monetary wager. Wagers are redistributed among bettors in a way that more highly rewards those with accurate predictions. We provide a class of wagering mechanisms that are guaranteed to satisfy truthfulness, budget balance in expectation, and other desirable properties while additionally guaranteeing epsilon-joint differential privacy in the bettors' reported beliefs, and analyze the trade-off between the achievable level of privacy and the sensitivity of a bettor's payment to her own report. We then ask whether it is possible to obtain privacy in dynamic prediction markets, focusing our attention on the popular cost-function framework in which securities with payments linked to future events are bought and sold by an automated market maker. We show that under general conditions, it is impossible for such a market maker to simultaneously achieve bounded worst-case loss and epsilon-differential privacy without allowing the privacy guarantee to degrade extremely quickly as the number of trades grows, making such markets impractical in settings in which privacy is valued. We conclude by suggesting several avenues for potentially circumventing this lower bound.
Reliable and Private Utility Signaling for Data Markets
State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University(区块链与数据安全国家重点实验室,浙江大学);Alibaba Group(阿里巴巴集团);Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Blockchain and Data Security Research Institute(杭州高新技术区(滨江)区块链与数据安全研究院);Xidian University(西安电子科技大学)
False Consensus, Information Theory, and Prediction Markets
我们研究了一个设置,贝叶斯代理与一个共同的先验有私人信息相关的事件的结果,并顺序公开宣布有关他们的信息。我们的主要结果表明,当代理人的私人信息是独立的条件对事件的结果,每当代理人有类似的信念的结果,他们的信息是聚合。也就是说,不存在虚假的共识。我们的主要结果有一个简短的证明基于自然信息理论框架。该框架的一个关键组成部分是“互动信息”的符号与人的信息价值的超/次加性属性之间的等价性。这提供了交互信息的直观解释和有趣的应用,它测量了三个随机变量共享的信息量。我们通过重新证明其中的两个额外结果来说明这个信息理论框架的力量:1)代理人在以循环方式宣布(摘要)信念时迅速达成一致[Aaronson 2005]; 2)来自[Chen et al 2010]的结果,关于预测市场代理人何时应该发布信息以最大化他们的支付。通过证明披露信息的期望报酬是所披露信息的条件互信息,我们解释了信息理论框架和预测市场中的上述结果。
University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Rice University(莱斯大学);Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing, University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校西蒙斯计算理论研究所);Inria Paris(巴黎国家信息与自动化研究所)