arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1602.07362cs.GTcs.AI
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私人预测市场的可能性和局限性

The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets

California Institute of Technology(加州理工学院);Microsoft Research(微软研究院)

Rachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

摘要:

我们考虑私人预测市场的设计,金融市场的设计,以引起对不确定事件的预测,而不透露太多的信息,市场参与者的行动或信念。我们的目标是设计一种市场机制,在这种机制中,参与者的交易或赌注以一种导致准确预测的方式影响市场行为,但没有一个参与者对其他人能够观察到的东西有太大的影响力。我们使用差分隐私的工具来研究这种机制的可能性和局限性。我们首先设计了一个私人的一次性投注机制,投注者指定一个信念的可能性,未来的事件和相应的货币赌注。赌注在投注者之间重新分配,以更高的奖励那些准确预测的人。我们提供了一类投注机制,保证满足真实性,预算平衡的期望,和其他理想的属性,同时还保证ε-联合差分隐私的投注者的报告的信念,并分析之间的权衡可实现的隐私水平和投注者的支付她自己的报告的敏感性。然后,我们问它是否有可能获得隐私的动态预测市场,集中我们的注意力在流行的成本函数框架,其中证券与未来事件的支付是由自动做市商购买和出售。我们表明,在一般条件下,这是不可能的,这样的做市商,同时实现有界的最坏情况下的损失和隐私-差分隐私,而不允许的隐私保证下降非常迅速的交易数量的增长,使这样的市场不切实际的设置中,隐私的价值。最后,我们提出了几种可能绕过这个下限的途径。

英文摘要:

We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market mechanisms in which participants' trades or wagers influence the market's behavior in a way that leads to accurate predictions, yet no single participant has too much influence over what others are able to observe. We study the possibilities and limitations of such mechanisms using tools from differential privacy. We begin by designing a private one-shot wagering mechanism in which bettors specify a belief about the likelihood of a future event and a corresponding monetary wager. Wagers are redistributed among bettors in a way that more highly rewards those with accurate predictions. We provide a class of wagering mechanisms that are guaranteed to satisfy truthfulness, budget balance in expectation, and other desirable properties while additionally guaranteeing epsilon-joint differential privacy in the bettors' reported beliefs, and analyze the trade-off between the achievable level of privacy and the sensitivity of a bettor's payment to her own report. We then ask whether it is possible to obtain privacy in dynamic prediction markets, focusing our attention on the popular cost-function framework in which securities with payments linked to future events are bought and sold by an automated market maker. We show that under general conditions, it is impossible for such a market maker to simultaneously achieve bounded worst-case loss and epsilon-differential privacy without allowing the privacy guarantee to degrade extremely quickly as the number of trades grows, making such markets impractical in settings in which privacy is valued. We conclude by suggesting several avenues for potentially circumventing this lower bound.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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