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arXiv 1210.4837cs.GTq-fin.TR
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设计信息证券

Designing Informative Securities

Yiling Chen, Mike Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

摘要:

我们创建了一个正式的框架,在预测市场的信息证券的设计。这些证券允许市场组织者推断感兴趣的事件的可能性,以及如果他知道所有交易员的私人信号。我们认为,总是信息的市场,市场是信息的参与者的一个特定的信号结构,和信息的市场构建从一个有限的证券选择的设计。我们发现,要实现信息,它可以是必要的,让参与者表达的信息,可能不是直接感兴趣的市场组织者,并了解参与者的信号结构是很重要的设计信息预测市场。

英文摘要:

We create a formal framework for the design of informative securities in prediction markets. These securities allow a market organizer to infer the likelihood of events of interest as well as if he knew all of the traders' private signals. We consider the design of markets that are always informative, markets that are informative for a particular signal structure of the participants, and informative markets constructed from a restricted selection of securities. We find that to achieve informativeness, it can be necessary to allow participants to express information that may not be directly of interest to the market organizer, and that understanding the participants' signal structure is important for designing informative prediction markets.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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