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arXiv 1602.02439cs.GT
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任务的动态匹配与分配

Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks

Kartik Ahuja, Mihaela van der Schaar

摘要:

在许多双边市场中,被匹配的各方对其特征的信息是不完全的。我们认为,参与各方都非常有耐心,并对长期伙伴关系感兴趣。因此,一旦最终的比赛确定,他们会持续很长一段时间。每一方都有机会在决赛前了解对方的(一些)相关信息。例如,寻找工作人员执行任务的客户经常进行要求工作人员执行某些任务的访谈,从而向双方提供信息。工人在这种面谈中的表现-因此所透露的信息-既取决于工人和任务的固有特征,也取决于工人采取的行动(例如付出的努力),而这些行动是客户所看不到的。因此,存在道德风险。我们的目标是得到一个动态的匹配机制,促进学习双方在最终的比赛之前实现,并确保工人方没有动机模糊学习他们的特点,通过他们的行动。我们得到这样一个机制,导致最终匹配,实现最佳性能(收入)的平衡。我们证明了均衡策略是长期联盟稳定的,这意味着没有工人和客户的子集可以通过偏离均衡策略而获益。我们推导出所有的结果下的建模假设,代理的效用被定义为在每个交互中获得的效用的平均值的限制。

英文摘要:

In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once the final matches are determined, they persist for a long time. Each side has an opportunity to learn (some) relevant information about the other before final matches are made. For instance, clients seeking workers to perform tasks often conduct interviews that require the workers to perform some tasks and thereby provide information to both sides. The performance of a worker in such an interview- and hence the information revealed - depends both on the inherent characteristics of the worker and the task and also on the actions taken by the worker (e.g. the effort expended), which are not observed by the client. Thus there is moral hazard. Our goal is to derive a dynamic matching mechanism that facilitates learning on both sides before final matches are achieved and ensures that the worker side does not have incentive to obscure learning of their characteristics through their actions. We derive such a mechanism that leads to final matching that achieve optimal performance (revenue) in equilibrium. We show that the equilibrium strategy is long-run coalitionally stable, which means there is no subset of workers and clients that can gain by deviating from the equilibrium strategy. We derive all the results under the modeling assumption that the utilities of the agents are defined as limit of means of the utility obtained in each interaction.

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