多对一稳定匹配中的容量变化
Capacity Variation in the Many-to-one Stable Matching
摘要:
多对一稳定匹配问题提供了几个现实世界的匹配市场,如学校选择和医院居民分配的基本抽象。双方的代理人通常被称为居民和医院。经典的设置假设代理人排名相反的一方,医院的能力是固定的。据了解,增加单个医院的能力,提高居民的最终分配。另一方面,减少单个医院的能力恶化了居民的分配。在这项工作中,我们研究的计算复杂性找到最佳的变化,导致最好的结果为居民的医院的能力,受到稳定性和能力变化的约束。首先,我们证明了寻找最优容量扩张的决策问题是NP-完全的,相应的优化问题在一定的因子内是不可逼近的。这个结果在严格和完全偏好下成立,即使我们将额外的能力分配给不相交的医院。第二,我们得到类似的计算复杂性的结果,容量减少的问题。最后,我们研究了这些问题的变种时,目标是最大化的大小不完全偏好列表下的最终匹配。
英文摘要:
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and hospitals. The classical setup assumes that the agents rank the opposite side and that the capacities of the hospitals are fixed. It is known that increasing the capacity of a single hospital improves the residents' final allocation. On the other hand, reducing the capacity of a single hospital deteriorates the residents' allocation. In this work, we study the computational complexity of finding the optimal variation of hospitals' capacities that leads to the best outcome for the residents, subject to stability and a capacity variation constraint. First, we show that the decision problem of finding the optimal capacity expansion is NP-complete and the corresponding optimization problem is inapproximable within a certain factor. This result holds under strict and complete preferences, and even if we allocate extra capacities to disjoint sets of hospitals. Second, we obtain analogous computational complexity results for the problem of capacity reduction. Finally, we study the variants of these problems when the goal is to maximize the size of the final matching under incomplete preference lists.
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