There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of questions pertaining to belief and truth in hypothesised types. We formulate three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior beliefs and show when the resulting beliefs are correct, and when they may fail to be correct. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term, and that they can be computed automatically with consistent performance effects. Furthermore, we analyse the conditions under which we are able complete our task optimally, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Finally, we show how the correctness of hypothesised types can be ascertained during the interaction via an automated statistical analysis.
Breaking the Martingale Curse: Multi-Agent Debate via Asymmetric Cognitive Potential Energy
Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence(莫扎德·本·扎耶德人工智能大学);Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China(中国人民大学国际关系学院);Harvard University(哈佛大学)
Credibility Governance: A Social Mechanism for Collective Self-Correction under Weak Truth Signals
School of Artificial Intelligence, Wuhan University(武汉大学人工智能学院);Tsinghua University(清华大学);University of California, Los Angeles(加州大学洛杉矶分校);State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence, BIGAI(通用人工智能国家重点实验室,BIGAI)