多元宇宙学中的预言和典型性
Prediction and typicality in multiverse cosmology
摘要:
在缺乏一个基本理论,可以精确预测可观察参数的值,人择推理试图限制这些参数的概率分布,以便于提取可测试的预测。这种方法的实用性最近一直在激烈辩论,特别是在声称我们生活在多元宇宙中的理论中,其中参数可能在我们可观察的视界之外的区域具有不同的值。在这个宇宙学框架内,我们调查的效力自上而下的人择推理的基础上弱人择原理。我们认为,最近的索赔,这是不清楚的,可以免除的概念,典型性完全或假定典型性,在比较所得的概率分布与观察。我们在一个具体的,自上而下的设置有关的暗物质,典型性的假设可以显着影响预测,从而提供了一个指南,如何在推理的错误,典型性转化为错误的预测能力的评估。我们推测,这种依赖于典型性是一个不可分割的特征,在更广泛的宇宙学背景下的人择推理,并主张明确列入措施的典型性在计划调用人择推理,以期提取预测的多元宇宙的情况。
英文摘要:
In the absence of a fundamental theory that precisely predicts values for observable parameters, anthropic reasoning attempts to constrain probability distributions over those parameters in order to facilitate the extraction of testable predictions. The utility of this approach has been vigorously debated of late, particularly in light of theories that claim we live in a multiverse, where parameters may take differing values in regions lying outside our observable horizon. Within this cosmological framework, we investigate the efficacy of top-down anthropic reasoning based on the weak anthropic principle. We argue contrary to recent claims that it is not clear one can either dispense with notions of typicality altogether or presume typicality, in comparing resulting probability distributions with observations. We show in a concrete, top-down setting related to dark matter, that assumptions about typicality can dramatically affect predictions, thereby providing a guide to how errors in reasoning regarding typicality translate to errors in the assessment of predictive power. We conjecture that this dependence on typicality is an integral feature of anthropic reasoning in broader cosmological contexts, and argue in favour of the explicit inclusion of measures of typicality in schemes invoking anthropic reasoning, with a view to extracting predictions from multiverse scenarios.
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