In recent years, the gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) has been significantly narrowed, particularly for QKD systems with arbitrarily awed optical receivers. The status for QKD systems with imperfect light sources is however less satisfactory, in the sense that the resulting secure key rates are often overly-dependent on the quality of state preparation. This is especially the case when the channel loss is high. Very recently, to overcome this limitation, Tamaki et al proposed a QKD protocol based on the so-called rejected data analysis, and showed that its security|in the limit of infinitely long keys|is almost independent of any encoding flaw in the qubit space, being this protocol compatible with the decoy state method. Here, as a step towards practical QKD, we show that a similar conclusion is reached in the finite-key regime, even when the intensity of the light source is unstable. More concretely, we derive security bounds for a wide class of realistic light sources and show that the bounds are also efficient in the presence of high channel loss. Our results strongly suggest the feasibility of long distance provably-secure communication with imperfect light sources.
The one-way Faraday-Michelson system is a very useful practical quantum cryptography system where Faraday mirrors(FMs) play an important role. In this paper we analyze the security of this system against imperfect FMs. We consider the security loophole caused by the imperfect FMs in Alice's and Bob's security zones. Then we implement a passive Faraday mirror attack in this system. By changing the values of the imperfection parameters of Alice's FMs, we calculate the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob induced by Eve and the probability that Eve obtains outcomes successfully. It is sho…
We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), with arbitrary individual imperfections simultaneously in the source and detectors. We provide the secure key generation rate, and show that only two parameters must be bounded to ensure security; the basis dependence of the source and a detector blinding parameter. The system may otherwise be completely uncharacterized and contain large losses.
Phase reference calibration is a necessary procedure in practical continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) for the need of Bell-State Measurement (BSM). However, the phase reference calibration may become imperfect in practical applications. We explored the practical security of CV-MDI-QKD with imperfect phase reference calibration under realistic conditions of lossy and noisy quantum channel. Specifically, a comprehensive framework is developed to model and characterize the imperfection of practical phase reference calibration operation, which i…
In practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, the state preparation and measurement are imperfect comparing with the ideal BB84 protocol, which are always state-dependent in practical realizations. If the state-dependent imperfections can not be regarded as an unitary transformation, it should not be considered as part of quantum channel noise introduced by the eavesdropper, the commonly used secret key rate formula GLLP can not be applied correspondingly. In this paper, the unconditional security of quantum key distribution with state-dependent imperfection has been analyzed by estimati…
Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources
Faculty of Engineering, University of Toyama（富山大学工学部）；Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学维戈量子通信中心）；Escuela de Ingeniería de Telecomunicación, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo（维戈大学电信工程学院信号理论与通信系）；atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学atlanTTic研究中心）；National Institute of Information and Communications Technology（信息通信研究机构）
Finite-key security analysis of decoy-state QKD with source and detector imperfections
University of Vigo（维戈大学）；Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo（维戈量子通信中心，维戈大学）；Escuela de Ingeniería de Telecomunicación, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo（电信工程学院，信号理论与通信系，维戈大学）；atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo（atlanTTic研究中心，维戈大学）
A quantum random number generator (QRNG) as a genuine source of randomness is essential in many applications, such as number simulation and cryptography. Recently, a source-independent quantum random number generator (SI-QRNG), which can generate secure random numbers with untrusted sources, has been realized. However, the measurement loopholes of the trusted but imperfect devices used in SI-QRNGs have not yet been fully explored, which will cause security problems, especially in high-speed systems. Here, we point out and evaluate the security loopholes of practical imperfect measurement devic…
Despite tremendous theoretical and experimental progress in continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD), its security has not been rigorously established for practical systems with multiple imperfections. The idea of tagging is widely used in security proofs of discrete variable quantum key distribution with imperfect devices. In this paper, we generalize the tagging idea from discrete variable to continuous variable. Based on untagged signals, we prove the security of the imperfect quantum key distribution system in the most conservative case. By introducing a generic imperfection…
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, an…
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is the most promising solution to the security issues in practical quantum key distribution systems. Though several experimental demonstrations of MDI QKD have been reported, they all make one crucial but not yet verified assumption, that is there are no flaws in state preparation. Such an assumption is unrealistic and security loopholes remain in the source. Here we present, to our knowledge, the first MDI-QKD experiment with state preparation flaws taken into consideration…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in principle offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. Continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution has the potential for high-key-rate and low-cost implementations using standard telecom components. Despite tremendous theoretical and experimental progress in continuous-variable quantum key distribution, the security has not been rigorously established for most current continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems that have imperfections. Among the imperfections, intensity fluctuation is a significant principal problem affecting secu…
In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. In practice, flaws in the state preparation undermine the security of QKD systems, as standard theoretical approaches to deal with state preparation flaws are not loss-tolerant. An eavesdropper can enhance and exploit such imperfections through quantum channel loss, thus dramatically lowering the key generation rate. Crucially, the security analyses of most existing QKD experiments are rather unrealistic as they typically neglect this effect. Here, we propose a novel and general approach th…
The quantum key distribution (QKD), guaranteed by the principle of quantum physics, is a promising solution for future secure information and communication technology. However, device imperfections compromise the security of real-life QKD systems, restricting the wide deployment of QKD. This study reports a decoy-state BB84 QKD experiment that considers both source and detection imperfections. In particular, we achieved a rigorous finite-key security bound over fiber links of up to 75 km by applying a systematic performance analysis. Furthermore, our study considers more device imperfections t…
The practical homodyne detector model of continuous-variable quantum key distribution models the inherent imperfections of the practical homodyne detector, namely the limited detection efficiency and the electronic noise, into trusted loss. However, the conventional practical homodyne detector model is valid only when both the imperfections of the practical homodyne detector are calibrated. In this paper, we show a modified practical homodyne detector model that can model the imperfections separately. The phase-sensitive amplifier is further applied to compensate the imperfections of the pract…
Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state preparation and measurement respectively. Until now, different attacking schemes have been proposed by utilizing imperfect devices, but the general security analysis model against all of the practical attacking schemes has not been proposed. Here, we demonstrate that the general practical attacking schemes can be divided into the Trojan horse attack, strong …
Counterfactual quantum cryptography (CQC), recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantage, such as its immunity to the well known PNS attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of CQC protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal[Phys. Rev. A 82, 042335 (2010)]. It is also showed that practical CQC implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can …
We address the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with squeezed states upon realistic conditions of noisy and lossy environment and limited reconciliation efficiency. Considering the generalized preparation scheme and clearly distinguishing between classical and quantum resources, we investigate the effect of finite squeezing on the tolerance of the protocol to untrusted channel noise. For a long-distance strongly attenuating channel and the consequent low reconciliation efficiency, we show that feasible limited squeezing is surprisingly sufficient to provide the security…
Numerical security analysis for practical quantum key distribution
Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo（维戈量子通信中心，维戈大学）；School of Telecommunication Engineering, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo（维戈大学电信工程学院信号理论与通信系）；atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo（维戈大学atlanTTic研究中心）
Quantum key distribution, first proposed by Bennett and Brassard, provides a possible key distribution scheme whose security depends only on the quantum laws of physics. So far the protocol has been proved secure even under channel noise and detector faults of the receiver, but is vulnerable if the photon source used is imperfect. In this paper we propose and give a concrete design for a new concept, {\it self-checking source}, which requires the manufacturer of the photon source to provide certain tests; these tests are designed such that, if passed, the source is guaranteed to be adequate fo…
As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We examine several discrepancies between theoretical models and experimental setups in the case of continuous-variable quantum key distribution. We study in particular the impact of an imperfect modulation on the security of Gaussian protocols and show that approximating the theoretical Gaussian modulation with a discrete one is sufficient in practice. We also ad…
We review the study on a two way quantum key distribution protocol given imperfect settings through a simple analysis of a toy model and show that it can outperform a BB84 setup. We provide the sufficient condition for this as a ratio of optimal intensities for the protocols.
The security of a deterministic quantum scheme for communication, namely the LM05 [1], is studied in presence of a lossy channel under the assumption of imperfect generation and detection of single photons. It is shown that the scheme allows for a rate of distillable secure bits higher than that pertaining to BB84 [2]. We report on a first implementation of LM05 with weak pulses.
Reference-frame-independent measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (RFI-MDI-QKD) can remove all potential detector side-channel attacks and the requirement of real-time alignment of reference frames. However, all previous RFI-MDI-QKD implementations assume the perfect state preparation in sources, which is impractical and may lead to security loopholes. Here, we propose a RFI-MDI-QKD protocol which is robust against state preparation flaws. Comparing to the conventional six-state RFI-MDI-QKD, our scheme can be realized with only four flawed states, which improves the practical…
The model of the quantum protocols sealing a classical bit is studied. It is shown that there exist upper bounds on its security. For any protocol where the bit can be read correctly with the probability $α$, and reading the bit can be detected with the probability $β$, the upper bounds are $% β\leqslant 1/2$ and $α+β\leqslant 9/8$.
We provide a simple method to obtain an upper bound on the secret key rate that is particularly suited to analyze practical realizations of quantum key distribution protocols with imperfect devices. We consider the so-called trusted device scenario where Eve cannot modify the actual detection devices employed by Alice and Bob. The upper bound obtained is based on the available measurements results, but it includes the effect of the noise and losses present in the detectors of the legitimate users.
Among various quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol has a unique feature that its security is guaranteed without monitoring any statistics. Moreover, this protocol has a remarkable property of being robust against source imperfections assuming that the emitted pulses are independent. Unfortunately, some experiments confirmed the violation of the independence due to pulse correlations, and therefore the lack of a security proof without taking into account this effect is an obstacle for the security. In this paper, we prove that the R…
We study how the imperfection of intensity modulator effects on the security of a practical quantum key distribution system. The extinction ratio of the realistic intensity modulator is considered in our security analysis. We show that the secret key rate increases, under the practical assumption that the indeterminable noise introduced by the imperfect intensity modulator can not be controlled by the eavesdropper.
Robust quantum key distribution with imperfections in state preparation and characterization
Henan Key Laboratory of Quantum Information and Cryptography, IEU（IEU量子信息与密码学河南省重点实验室）；State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks, Shanghai Key Lab of Navigation and Location Services, Department of Electronic Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University（上海交通大学电子工程系先进光通信系统与网络国家重点实验室上海导航与定位服务重点实验室）
Unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocol can be guaranteed by the basic property of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, the practical quantum key distribution system always have some imperfections, and the practical system may be attacked if the imperfection can be controlled by the eavesdropper Eve. Applying the fatal security loophole introduced by the imperfect beam splitter's wavelength dependent optical property, we propose wavelength-dependent attacking model, which can be applied to almost all practical quantum key distribution systems with the passive state modulation …
Experimental quantum cryptography with single photons and imperfect devices
University of Waterloo（滑铁卢大学）；Department for Quantum Technology, University of Münster（明斯特大学量子技术系）；Institute for Physics and Astronomy, Technical University of Berlin（柏林工业大学物理与天文学研究所）；Toshiba Europe Ltd.（东芝欧洲有限公司）；Advanced Quantum Light Sources GmbH（先进量子光源有限公司）；Key Laboratory of Optoelectronic Materials and Devices, Institute of Semiconductors, Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院半导体研究所光电材料与器件重点实验室）
Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is an important branch of quantum communication that transmits confidential message directly in a quantum channel without utilizing encryption and decryption. It not only prevents eavesdropping during transmission, but also eliminates the security loophole associated with key storage and management. Recently measurement-device-independent (MDI) QSDC protocols in which the measurement is performed by an untrusted party using imperfect measurement devices have been constructed, and MDI-QSDC eliminates the security loopholes originating from the imperfec…
The first device-independent quantum private query protocol (MRT17) which is proposed by Maitra \emph{et al.} [Phys. Rev. A 95, 042344 (2017)] to enhance the security through the certification of the states and measurements. However, the MRT17 protocol works under an assumption of perfect detectors, which increases difficulty in the implementations. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate what would affect the security of this protocol if the detectors were imperfect. Meanwhile, Maitra \emph{et al.} also pointed out that this problem remains open. In this paper, we analyze the security of MRT1…
We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse. We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme. Moreov…
Quantum key distribution over probabilistic quantum repeaters is addressed. We compare, under practical assumptions, two such schemes in terms of their secure key generation rates per quantum memory. The two schemes under investigation are the one proposed by Duan et al. in [Nat. 414, 413 (2001)] and that of Sangouard et al. in [Phys. Rev. A 76, 050301 (2007)]. We consider various sources of imperfection in both protocols, such as nonzero double-photon probabilities at the sources, dark counts in detectors, and inefficiencies in the channel, photodetectors and memories. We also consider memory…
In principle, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. In practice, however, the imperfections of realistic devices might introduce deviations from the idealized models used in security analyses. Can quantum code-breakers successfully hack real systems by exploiting the side channels? Can quantum code-makers design innovative counter-measures to foil quantum code-breakers? This article reviews theoretical and experimental progress in the practical security aspects of quantum code-making and quantum code-breaking. After numerous attempts…
Side-channel-secure quantum key distribution with correlated sources
University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学技术大学）；Laboratory of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学技术大学量子信息实验室）；Anhui Province Key Laboratory of Quantum Network, University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学技术大学安徽省量子网络重点实验室）；CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China（中国科学技术大学中国科学院量子信息与量子物理前沿卓越中心）
Round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution (RRDPS QKD) has been proposed to raise the noise tolerability of the channel. However, in practice, the measurement device in RRDPS QKD may be imperfect. Here, we show that, with these imperfections, the security of RRDPS may be damaged, by proposing two attacks for RRDPS systems with uncharacterized measurement devices. One is valid even for a system with unit total efficiency, while the other is valid even when a single photon state is sent. To prevent these attacks, either security arguments need to be fundamentally revised or fu…
We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model.
Experimental Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key distribution with Flawed State-Preparation over 300 km
Henan Key Laboratory of Quantum Information and Cryptography, IEU（量子信息与密码学河南省重点实验室，IEU）；State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks, Shanghai Key Lab of Navigation and Location Services, Department of Electronic Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University（先进光通信系统与国家网络国家重点实验室，导航与位置服务上海市重点实验室，电子工程系，上海交通大学）
The faraday mirror (FM) plays a very important role in maintaining the stability of two way plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) system. However, the practical FM is imperfect, which will not only introduce additional quantum bit error rate (QBER) but also leave a loophole for Eve to spy the secret key. In this paper, we propose a passive faraday mirror attack in two way QKD system based on the imperfection of FM. Our analysis shows that, if the FM is imperfect, the dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the four states sent by Alice is three instead of two. Thus Eve can distinguish the…
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic assumptions and neglect many relevant device imperfections. As a result, they cannot guarantee the security of the practical implementations. Recently, the loss-tolerant protocol (K. Tamaki et al, Phys. Rev. A, 90, 052314, 2014) was proposed to make QKD robust against state preparation flaws. This protocol relies on the emission of qubit systems which, unfortunately, is difficult to achieve in practice. In this wor…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven for different protocols, in particular for the BB84 protocol. It has been shown that this scheme is robust against eventual imperfections in the state preparation, and sending only three different states delivers the same secret key rate achievable with four states. In this work, we prove, in a finite-key scenario, that the security of this protocol can be maintained even with less measurement operators on the receiver. This allows us to implement a time-bin encoding scheme with a minimum amount of resources.
The decoy state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy states with different intensities: modulation of the pump current of a semiconductor laser diode, and external modulation by an optical intensity modulator. The former approach shows a side-channel in the time domain that allows an attacker to distinguish s signal state from a decoy state, breaking a basic assumption in the protocol. We model a photon-number-sp…
In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of device and channel imperfection. In this Letter we show that the security of QKD protocols is ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such knowledge should always be …
A quantum random-number generator (QRNG) can theoretically generate unpredictable random numbers with perfect devices and is an ideal and secure source of random numbers for cryptography. However, the practical implementations always contain imperfections, which will greatly influence the randomness of the final output and even open loopholes to eavesdroppers. Recently, Thewes et al. experimentally demonstrated a continuous-variable eavesdropping attack, based on heterodyne detection, on a trusted continuous-variable QRNG in Phys. Rev. A 100, 052318 (2019), yet like in many other practical con…
