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arXiv 1502.01169quant-ph
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连续变量量子密钥分发中新的边信道攻击

Novel Side Channel Attacks in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution

Elizabeth Newton, Matthew C. J. Everitt, Freya L. Wilson, Benjamin T. H. Varcoe

摘要:

实验性的量子密钥分发(QKD)协议不仅要实现无条件安全的量子传输,而且要实现密钥协调和纠错的经典交换。有大量的工作研究了对量子信道的量子攻击,但在这里,我们开始研究对经典通信和交换的经典攻击。将独立的安全协议链接在一起可能会意外地将信息泄露给窃听者,即使这些组件在隔离时是无条件安全的。在这里,我们特别关注量子和经典协议之间的连接,发现在量子-经典边界的交叉中,一些安全性总是和非直观地丢失。这种情况发生时,双方之间没有任何沟通。虽然这个特定的例子只适用于连续变量量子密钥分发(CVQKD),但它强调了重新检查所有单独协议实际使用方式的必要性。

英文摘要:

Experimental Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have to consist of not only the unconditionally secure quantum transmission, but also a subsequent classical exchange that enables key reconciliation and error correction. There is a large body of work examining quantum attacks on the quantum channel, but here we begin to examine classical attacks to both the classical communication and the exchange as a whole. Linking together separate secure protocols can unexpectedly leak information to an eavesdropper, even if the components are unconditionally secure in isolation. Here we focus specifically on the join between quantum and classical protocols, finding that in just this crossing of the quantum-classical boundary, some security is always and unintuitively lost. This occurs with no communication between the separate parties. While this particular example applies to only Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD), it highlights the need to re-examine the way all individual protocols are actually used.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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