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arXiv 1410.5567cs.CR
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无公开信息的信息流策略的加密实施

Cryptographic Enforcement of Information Flow Policies without Public Information

Jason Crampton, Naomi Farley, Gregory Gutin, Mark Jones, Bertram Poettering

摘要:

密码访问控制的研究已经有30多年的历史,现在已经是一个成熟的研究课题。当使用对称加密原语时,每个受保护的资源都被加密,只有授权用户才能访问加密密钥。通过将密钥本身视为受保护的资源,有可能开发出这样的方案,其中授权密钥是从明确分配给用户拥有的密钥和公开可用的信息中导出的。一般认为,每个用户将被分配一个单一的钥匙,所有其他授权的钥匙将从该单一的钥匙派生出来。最近的工作挑战了这一假设,开发计划,不需要公共信息,权衡是,用户可能需要一个以上的关键。然而,这些新的计划,这需要一个链划分的偏序集的访问控制策略的基础上,有一些缺点。在本文中,我们定义了一个基于树的加密执行计划,它像基于链的计划,不需要公共信息的概念。我们建立了基于链的计划的强安全性保留了基于树的计划,并提供了一个有效的建设派生基于树的执法计划从一个给定的政策,最大限度地减少所需的密钥的数量。

英文摘要:

Cryptographic access control has been studied for over 30 years and is now a mature research topic. When symmetric cryptographic primitives are used, each protected resource is encrypted and only authorized users should have access to the encryption key. By treating the keys themselves as protected resources, it is possible to develop schemes in which authorized keys are derived from the keys explicitly assigned to the user's possession and publicly available information. It has been generally assumed that each user would be assigned a single key from which all other authorized keys would be derived. Recent work has challenged this assumption by developing schemes that do not require public information, the trade-off being that a user may require more than one key. However, these new schemes, which require a chain partition of the partially ordered set on which the access control policy is based, have some disadvantages. In this paper we define the notion of a tree-based cryptographic enforcement scheme, which, like chain-based schemes, requires no public information. We establish that the strong security properties of chain-based schemes are preserved by tree-based schemes, and provide an efficient construction for deriving a tree-based enforcement scheme from a given policy that minimizes the number of keys required.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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