发现C程序中的信息流策略违规
Uncovering Information Flow Policy Violations in C Programs
摘要:
用C语言编写的加密应用程序的程序员需要避免常见的错误,例如通过公共通道发送私有数据,用不可信的函数修改可信数据,或不正确地排序协议步骤。使用现有的通用工具检查这些保密性、完整性和排序策略可能很麻烦。我们开发了一种新的方法来指定和发现违反这些政策的行为,这种方法比以前的工具更轻量级。我们通过源代码到源代码的转换将策略注释嵌入到C的类型系统中,并利用现有的C编译器来检查策略违规,从而实现高性能和可扩展性。我们通过最近的加密库和应用程序的案例研究表明,我们的工作是能够表达详细的政策,大型机构的C代码,可以找到微妙的违反政策。为了获得正式的理解,我们的政策注释,我们展示了正式的政策注释和信息流类型系统之间的连接,并证明了不干涉保证。
英文摘要:
Programmers of cryptographic applications written in C need to avoid common mistakes such as sending private data over public channels, modifying trusted data with untrusted functions, or improperly ordering protocol steps. These secrecy, integrity, and sequencing policies can be cumbersome to check with existing general-purpose tools. We have developed a novel means of specifying and uncovering violations of these policies that allows for a much lighter-weight approach than previous tools. We embed the policy annotations in C's type system via a source-to-source translation and leverage existing C compilers to check for policy violations, achieving high performance and scalability. We show through case studies of recent cryptographic libraries and applications that our work is able to express detailed policies for large bodies of C code and can find subtle policy violations. To gain formal understanding of our policy annotations, we show formal connections between the policy annotations and an information flow type system and prove a noninterference guarantee.
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