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arXiv 1409.0309cs.CRcs.LO
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用体系结构推理信息安全

Using Architecture to Reason about Information Security

Stephen Chong, Ron van der Meyden

摘要:

我们证明,通过一些例子,信息流的安全属性可以证明从抽象的体系结构描述,只描述系统的因果结构和本地属性的可信组件。我们指定这些体系结构的描述系统概括不传递的不干扰政策承认的能力,过滤通信域之间传递的信息。这种系统架构的细化的概念,支持自上而下的开发架构规范和证明的抽象信息安全属性。我们还表明,在一个具体的设置中,因果结构是强制执行的访问控制,静态检查的访问控制设置加上本地验证的可信组件足以证明,广义的不传递不干扰政策是满意的。

英文摘要:

We demonstrate, by a number of examples, that information-flow security properties can be proved from abstract architectural descriptions, that describe only the causal structure of a system and local properties of trusted components. We specify these architectural descriptions of systems by generalizing intransitive noninterference policies to admit the ability to filter information passed between communicating domains. A notion of refinement of such system architectures is developed that supports top-down development of architectural specifications and proofs by abstraction of information security properties. We also show that, in a concrete setting where the causal structure is enforced by access control, a static check of the access control setting plus local verification of the trusted components is sufficient to prove that a generalized intransitive noninterference policy is satisfied.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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