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arXiv 1408.0703cs.GTcs.AI
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完全信息位置拍卖的计算分析

Computational Analysis of Perfect-Information Position Auctions

University of British Columbia(不列颠哥伦比亚大学)

David R. M Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown

摘要:

在对其他设计进行试验之后,主要的搜索引擎都集中在加权的广义第二价格拍卖(wGSP)上来销售关键字广告。值得注意的是,这种趋同发生在头寸拍卖在理论上被充分理解(或者说,实际上,被广泛研究)之前。虽然取得了很大的进展,因为,理论分析仍然无法解决的问题,为什么搜索引擎发现wGSP优于其他位置拍卖。我们以一种新的方式来处理这个问题,采用一种新的分析范式,我们称之为“计算机制分析”。通过从给定的分布中对位置拍卖游戏进行采样,用计算效率高的表示语言对其进行编码,计算它们的纳什均衡,然后计算感兴趣的经济数量,我们可以定量地回答理论方法没有的问题。我们考虑了文献中七个广泛研究的估值模型和三个位置拍卖变体(广义第一价格,未加权广义第二价格和wGSP)。我们发现,wGSP始终显示出任何位置拍卖中最好的广告,以社会福利和相关性(预期点击数)衡量。即使在wGSP已经知道具有糟糕的最坏情况效率的模型中,我们发现它几乎总是平均表现良好。相反,我们发现,收入是非常可变的拍卖机制,是高度敏感的均衡选择,偏好模型和估值分布。

英文摘要:

After experimentation with other designs, the major search engines converged on the weighted, generalized second-price auction (wGSP) for selling keyword advertisements. Notably, this convergence occurred before position auctions were well understood (or, indeed, widely studied) theoretically. While much progress has been made since, theoretical analysis is still not able to settle the question of why search engines found wGSP preferable to other position auctions. We approach this question in a new way, adopting a new analytical paradigm we dub "computational mechanism analysis." By sampling position auction games from a given distribution, encoding them in a computationally efficient representation language, computing their Nash equilibria, and then calculating economic quantities of interest, we can quantitatively answer questions that theoretical methods have not. We considered seven widely studied valuation models from the literature and three position auction variants (generalized first price, unweighted generalized second price, and wGSP). We found that wGSP consistently showed the best ads of any position auction, measured both by social welfare and by relevance (expected number of clicks). Even in models where wGSP was already known to have bad worse-case efficiency, we found that it almost always performed well on average. In contrast, we found that revenue was extremely variable across auction mechanisms, and was highly sensitive to equilibrium selection, the preference model, and the valuation distribution.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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