AI 中文总结
本文研究带有私人位置偏好的两位置拍卖，分析第一价格规则下的均衡福利，证明确定性单轮拍卖实现有效分配的通信条件，并将福利保证提升至1−1/e，探讨其在优先级服务拍卖和区块链交易排序中的应用。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究向具有私人异序偏好的单位需求竞标者出售两个位置的拍卖：部分是仅重视第一个位置的专业竞标者，其余是对两个位置无差异的通才竞标者。首先，我们考虑标准的第一价格规则，该规则将第一个和第二个物品分别分配给最高和第二高的竞标者。我们证明，无论支付如何，没有任何策略配置能在所有类型配置下事后实现有效分配，并给出了分布无关的均衡福利保证为1/2。为补充该结果，我们证明对于确定性单轮拍卖和离散出价，有效分配要求每个竞标者传递的信息比其出价的二进制表示至少多1比特。接下来，我们询问在赢家支付其出价的格式中，这额外的1比特能实现什么，其中竞标者还可指定特定物品偏好。特别地，我们证明这将我们的分布无关均衡福利保证提升至1−1/e。最后，我们讨论了我们的结果在优先级服务拍卖和区块链交易排序中的适用性。
英文摘要
We study auctions where two positions are sold to unit-demand bidders with private heterogeneous order preferences: some are specialists} who value only the first position, while others are generalists indifferent between the two. First, we consider a first-price rule which allocates the first and second items to the highest and second-highest bidders, respectively. We show that no strategy profile ex-post implements the efficient allocation at every type profile, irrespective of payments, and provide a distribution-free equilibrium welfare guarantee of $\frac{1}{2}$. To augment this result, we prove that for deterministic one-round auctions and discrete bids, the efficient allocation requires each bidder to communicate at least one bit more than its bid's binary representation. We next ask what the same bit accomplishes in winner-pays-bid formats where bidders can also specify specific item preferences. In particular, we show that this strengthens our distribution-free equilibrium welfare guarantee to $1-\frac{1}{e}$. Finally, we discuss the applicability to priority service, blockchain transaction ordering, and cloud compute and artificial intelligence (AI) marketplaces.
Comments77 pages, 3 figures
