We study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for the mechanisms used in Internet services (e.g., online reviews and question-answer websites) to incentivize users to generate high-quality content. Most existing work assumes that users are homogeneous and have the same ability. However, real-world users are heterogeneous and their abilities can be very different from each other due to their diverse background, culture, and profession. In this work, we consider heterogeneous users with the following framework: (1) the users are heterogeneous and each of them has a private type indicating the best quality of the content she can generate; (2) there is a fixed amount of reward to allocate to the participated users. Under this framework, we study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium of several mechanisms composed by different allocation rules, action spaces, and information settings. We prove the existence of PNE for some mechanisms and the non-existence of PNE for some mechanisms. We also discuss how to find a PNE for those mechanisms with PNE either through a constructive way or a search algorithm.
Nash Equilibrium Computation in Subnetwork Zero-Sum Games with Switching Communications
Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院);Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学);College of Engineering and Computer Science, The Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学工程与计算机科学学院);ACCESS Linnaeus Centre, School of Electrical Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology(瑞典皇家理工学院电气工程学院 ACCESS 林奈中心)
How Humans Help LLMs: Assessing and Incentivizing Human Preference Annotators
Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London(帝国理工学院商学院,帝国理工学院);University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney(悉尼大学商学院,悉尼大学);Meta
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Existence of Potential Functions for Heterogeneous Routing Games
ACCESS Linnaeus Center, School of Electrical Engineering, KTH Royal Institute of Technology(KTH皇家理工学院电气工程学院);department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California at Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校电气工程与计算机科学系);department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California at Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校土木与环境工程系)
Joint Local Relational Augmentation and Global Nash Equilibrium for Federated Learning with Non-IID Data
College of Computer Science, Zhejiang University(浙江大学计算机学院);Tiansuan Lab, Ant Group(蚂蚁集团天算实验室);College of Computer and Data Science, Fuzhou University(福州大学计算机与大数据学院)