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arXiv 1404.5155cs.GT
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从异质用户中激励高质量内容:基于纳什均衡的存在性

Incentivizing High-quality Content from Heterogeneous Users: On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium

Yingce Xia, Tao Qin, Nenghai Yu, Tie-Yan Liu

摘要:

我们研究了互联网服务中使用的机制(例如,在线评论和问答网站),以激励用户生成高质量的内容。大多数现有的工作假设用户是同质的,并具有相同的能力。然而,现实世界的用户是异质的,由于他们不同的背景,文化和职业,他们的能力可能彼此非常不同。在这项工作中,我们考虑异构用户与以下框架:(1)用户是异构的,他们每个人都有一个私人类型,表明她可以生成的内容的最佳质量;(2)有一个固定的奖励金额分配给参与的用户。在此框架下,我们研究了由不同的分配规则、行动空间和信息设置组成的多个机制的纯纳什均衡的存在性。我们证明了一些机制的PNE的存在性和不存在的PNE的一些机制。我们还讨论了如何找到一个PNE为这些机制与PNE无论是通过一个建设性的方式或搜索算法。

英文摘要:

We study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for the mechanisms used in Internet services (e.g., online reviews and question-answer websites) to incentivize users to generate high-quality content. Most existing work assumes that users are homogeneous and have the same ability. However, real-world users are heterogeneous and their abilities can be very different from each other due to their diverse background, culture, and profession. In this work, we consider heterogeneous users with the following framework: (1) the users are heterogeneous and each of them has a private type indicating the best quality of the content she can generate; (2) there is a fixed amount of reward to allocate to the participated users. Under this framework, we study the existence of pure Nash equilibrium of several mechanisms composed by different allocation rules, action spaces, and information settings. We prove the existence of PNE for some mechanisms and the non-existence of PNE for some mechanisms. We also discuss how to find a PNE for those mechanisms with PNE either through a constructive way or a search algorithm.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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