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arXiv 1903.07261cs.GT
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一种具有异构组件关键度的网络监控博弈

A Network Monitoring Game with Heterogeneous Component Criticality Levels

Jezdimir Milosevic, Mathieu Dahan, Saurabh Amin, Henrik Sandberg

摘要:

我们认为一个攻击者运营商的游戏,用于监控一个大规模的网络,该网络由不同的关键级别的组件组成。在这种零和游戏中,运营商试图定位有限数量的传感器来监控网络,以对抗战略性地针对网络组件的攻击者。运营商(Resp。攻击者)寻求最小化(相应地,最大化)网络损耗。为了研究这个博弈的混合策略纳什均衡的性质,我们首先研究两个简单的例子:(i)当单个传感器位置监控的组件集相互不相交时;(ii)当只有一个传感器被定位,但可能重叠的监控组件集。我们的分析揭示了新的见解,关键水平如何影响球员的均衡策略。接下来,我们扩展了以前已知的方法,以获得近似的纳什均衡的一般情况下的游戏。这种方法使用最小集合覆盖和最大集合包装问题的解决方案来构建近似的纳什均衡。最后,我们实现了一个列生成过程,以改善这种解决方案和数值评估我们的方法的性能。

英文摘要:

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor the network against an attacker who strategically targets a network component. The operator (resp. attacker) seeks to minimize (resp. maximize) the network loss. To study the properties of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria of this game, we first study two simple instances: (i) When component sets monitored by individual sensor locations are mutually disjoint; (ii) When only a single sensor is positioned, but with possibly overlapping monitoring component sets. Our analysis reveals new insights on how criticality levels impact the players equilibrium strategies. Next, we extend a previously known approach to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for the general case of the game. This approach uses solutions to minimum set cover and maximum set packing problems to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, we implement a column generation procedure to improve this solution and numerically evaluate the performance of our approach.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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