连接Level-K与纳什均衡的桥梁
Bridging Level-K to Nash Equilibrium
AI总结:
本文提出NLK模型,连接纳什均衡与Level-K,允许参与者认为对手可能不如或同样老练,在多个博弈数据上以更少参数更好解释实验,并讨论扩展。
摘要:
我们引入了NLK模型,该模型将纳什均衡(NE)与Level-K联系起来。它允许博弈中的参与者认为其对手可能不如自己老练,或与自己同样老练,这一观点在心理学中有所支持。我们将NLK应用于来自五篇已发表论文的数据,这些论文涉及静态博弈、动态博弈和拍卖博弈。NLK提供了与NE和Level-K不同的预测;此外,在许多情况下,NLK的一个简单版本能以相同或更少的参数数量更好地解释实验数据。我们讨论了对多于两个参与者的博弈以及异质信念的扩展。
英文摘要:
We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。