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arXiv 1402.4783q-fin.GNphysics.soc-ph
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系统性风险映射:金融网络的临界度与失效分布

Mapping systemic risk: critical degree and failures distribution in financial networks

Matteo Smerlak, Brady Stoll, Agam Gupta, James S. Magdanz

摘要:

2008年的金融危机表明,需要对紧密关联的金融结构中的系统性风险有一个彻底的、实用的理解。复杂网络上的动态过程本质上是困难的,这个问题的最新研究依赖于数值模拟。在这里,我们报告的分析结果,在网络模型的银行间借贷的基础上直接相关的金融参数,如利率和杠杆率。使用平均场方法,我们得到了一个封闭形式的公式的“临界度”,即每个银行的债权人的数量低于个人冲击可以传播整个网络。我们将失败分布(一次冲击导致$F$失败的概率)与度分布(银行有$k$债权人的概率)联系起来,特别表明前者是厚尾的,而后者是。我们的传染开始的标准原来是同构的条件合作发展的图和社交网络,最近制定的进化博弈论。这种显著的联系支持了最近关于金融和生态之间在方法上和解的呼吁。

英文摘要:

The 2008 financial crisis illustrated the need for a thorough, functional understanding of systemic risk in strongly interconnected financial structures. Dynamic processes on complex networks being intrinsically difficult, most recent studies of this problem have relied on numerical simulations. Here we report analytical results in a network model of interbank lending based on directly relevant financial parameters, such as interest rates and leverage ratios. Using a mean-field approach, we obtain a closed-form formula for the "critical degree", viz. the number of creditors per bank below which an individual shock can propagate throughout the network. We relate the failures distribution (probability that a single shock induces $F$ failures) to the degree distribution (probability that a bank has $k$ creditors), showing in particular that the former is fat-tailed whenever the latter is. Our criterion for the onset of contagion turns out to be isomorphic to the condition for cooperation to evolve on graphs and social networks, as recently formulated in evolutionary game theory. This remarkable connection supports recent calls for a methodological rapprochement between finance and ecology.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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