AI 中文总结
该研究构建带随机流动性冲击的银行间网络模型，发现债务稀释作为后门纾困可提升金融网络稳定性，指数网络能实现最优转移但不稳定，核心-外围网络稳定，解释了银行间结构及危机保险不足的现象。
AI 中文摘要
我们构建了具有随机流动性冲击的银行间网络模型。可稀释债务（如长期无担保债务）组成的网络可促进高效的流动性转移：受冲击银行将银行间债权作为新优先债务的抵押品，稀释现有债务。与不可稀释债务不同，债务规模和连通性是稳定而非脆弱的来源。因此，稀释是一种无需清算机构、触发证券或事后重新谈判的“后门纾困”，可重新分配损失。我们发现一类“指数网络”可通过普通债务实现最优或有转移，但指数网络并非两两稳定，而一些核心-外围网络是稳定的，这解释了观察到的银行间结构及其对危机的保险不足现象。
英文摘要
We develop a model of interbank networks with random liquidity shocks. Networks of dilutable debt---e.g., long-term, unsecured---facilitate efficient liquidity transfers: Shocked banks pledge interbank claims as collateral for new senior debt, diluting existing debt. Unlike with non-dilutable debt, indebtedness and connectedness are sources of stability, not fragility. Dilution is thus a ``backdoor bail-in'' that reallocates losses absent a resolution authority, trigger security, or ex post renegotiation. We uncover a class of networks, ``exponential networks,'' that implement optimal contingent transfers via plain debt. Yet exponential networks are not pairwise stable, whereas some core--periphery networks are, rationalizing observed interbank structures and their under-insurance against crises.
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