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arXiv 1304.1508cs.AI
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论知识、信念与道德的关系

The Relationship between Knowledge, Belief and Certainty

Joseph Y. Halpern

摘要:

我们考虑知识和确定性之间的关系,其中一个事实是已知的,如果它在一个代理人认为可能的所有世界都是真的,如果它以概率1成立,那么它是确定的。我们将确定性等同于概率信念。我们表明,如果我们假设一个固定的概率分配,那么逻辑KD 45,这已被确定为也许是最合适的信念,提供了一个完整的公理化推理的确定性。正如一个行动者可以相信一个事实,尽管phi是假的,他可以确定一个事实,尽管phi是假的,但phi是真的。然而,很容易看出,一个智能体只有在概率为0的世界集合上才能有这样的错误(概率)信念。如果我们把注意力限制在所有世界都有正概率的结构上,那么S5提供了一个完整的公理化。如果我们考虑一个更一般的设置,其中每个世界可能有不同的概率分配,那么通过在概率函数(具有非零概率的世界集合)的支持上放置适当的条件,我们可以捕获许多其他着名的模态逻辑,例如T和S4。最后,我们考虑哪些公理表征满足米勒原理的结构。

英文摘要:

We consider the relation between knowledge and certainty, where a fact is known if it is true at all worlds an agent considers possible and is certain if it holds with probability 1. We identify certainty with probabilistic belief. We show that if we assume one fixed probability assignment, then the logic KD45, which has been identified as perhaps the most appropriate for belief, provides a complete axiomatization for reasoning about certainty. Just as an agent may believe a fact although phi is false, he may be certain that a fact phi, is true although phi is false. However, it is easy to see that an agent can have such false (probabilistic) beliefs only at a set of worlds of probability 0. If we restrict attention to structures where all worlds have positive probability, then S5 provides a complete axiomatization. If we consider a more general setting, where there might be a different probability assignment at each world, then by placing appropriate conditions on the support of the probability function (the set of worlds which have non-zero probability), we can capture many other well-known modal logics, such as T and S4. Finally, we consider which axioms characterize structures satisfying Miller's principle.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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