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arXiv 1303.1434cs.GT
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不平等与网络形成博弈

Inequality and Network Formation Games

Samuel D. Johnson, Raissa M. D'Souza

摘要:

本文讨论了网络形成博弈中的不等式问题。我们采用了一个量,我们称之为纳什不等式比(NIR),定义为最大比率之间的最高和最低成本发生在一个纳什均衡策略,以表征在均衡的程度,不平等是可能的。我们给出了Fabrikant等人(PODC '03)和Ehsani等人(SPAA '11)的网络形成游戏的NIR上界。关于平等与社会效率之间的关系,我们表明,与普遍的期望相反,效率并不一定以不平等的增加为代价。

英文摘要:

This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual agents in a Nash equilibrium strategy, to characterize the extent to which inequality is possible in equilibrium. We give tight upper bounds on the NIR for the network formation games of Fabrikant et al. (PODC '03) and Ehsani et al. (SPAA '11). With respect to the relationship between equality and social efficiency, we show that, contrary to common expectations, efficiency does not necessarily come at the expense of increased inequality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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