背景适应度、生态进化反馈和鹰鸽博弈
Background fitness, eco-evolutionary feedbacks and the Hawk-Dove game
摘要：
本文进一步发展工作，从以前的文章，介绍了一种新的方式建模的进化博弈模型，强调生态现实主义，关注如何生态因子〈动〉<动>决定收益的进化博弈。目前的文件是集中在选择性中性因素的影响（即那些是相同的所有战略），如背景健身和中性密度依赖于游戏动态。在以前的论文中，背景死亡率是由生殖后死亡率建模的，描述了游戏相互作用之间的总死亡率。本文提出了一种新的方法来建模的背景健身，根据不同的发生率（强度）的游戏互动和背景事件。结果表明，新方法比以往的方法更真实和自然的动态模型。前一种方法实际上产生了有偏差的轨迹，但它与静止点处的新方法是兼容的。此外，本文提出了一个严格的稳定性分析的静止点的动态。结果表明，稳定或不稳定的休息点，可以解释的生态进化反馈机制。所得结果通过一个鹰鸽博弈的例子进行了说明。
英文摘要：
This paper further develops work from a previous article which introduced a new way of modelling evolutionary game models with an emphasis on ecological realism, concerned with how ecological factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games. The current paper is focused on the impact of selectively neutral factors (i.e. those that are the same for all strategies), such as background fitness and a neutral density dependence on game dynamics. In the previous paper background mortality was modelled by post-reproductive mortality describing aggregated mortality between game interactions. In this paper a novel approach to the modelling of background fitness, based on different occurrence rates (intensities) of game interactions and background events is presented. It is shown that the new method is more realistic and natural for dynamic models than the method used in the previous paper. The previous method in effect produces biased trajectories, but it is compatible with the new approach at the restpoints. Also in this paper a rigorous stability analysis of the restpoints of the dynamics is presented. It is shown that the stability or instability of the restpoints, can be explained by a mechanism of eco-evolutionary feedback. The results obtained are illustrated by a Hawk-Dove game example.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
