发现非局部支付计算对ESS稳定性的影响：集合种群中鹰鸽博弈的空间格局
Discovering the effect of nonlocal payoff calculation on the stabilty of ESS: Spatial patterns of Hawk-Dove game in metapopulations
摘要：
经典的进化稳定策略（ESS）模型不涉及任何空间依赖性。我们考虑了一个空间鹰-鸽游戏的动物在一个补丁的环境中，周围的边界环绕。我们保证每个站点包含相同数量的个人。作为经典的频率依赖的Moran过程的平均动力学，通过迁移和非局部支付计算耦合在一维和二维栖息地的ESS的稳定性分析的演化方程。线性稳定性分析的模型进行和观察空间格局的条件进行了调查。对于最近邻相互作用（包括2D中的冯·诺依曼和摩尔邻域），我们得出结论，当扩散率足够小时，有可能破坏游戏的ESS并观察图案的形成。我们数值研究了通过最近邻支付计算和扩散耦合的复制子方程产生的空间模式。
英文摘要：
The classical idea of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) modeling animal behavior does not involve any spatial dependence. We considered a spatial Hawk-Dove game played by animals in a patchy environment with wrap around boundaries. We posit that each site contains the same number of individuals. An evolution equation for analyzing the stability of the ESS is found as the mean dynamics of the classical frequency dependent Moran process coupled via migration and nonlocal payoff calculation in 1D and 2D habitats. The linear stability analysis of the model is performed and conditions to observe spatial patterns are investigated. For the nearest neighbor interactions (including von Neumann and Moore neighborhoods in 2D) we concluded that it is possible to destabilize the ESS of the game and observe pattern formation when the dispersal rate is small enough. We numerically investigate the spatial patterns arising from the replicator equations coupled via nearest neighbor payoff calculation and dispersal.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
