多产品社交网络中的参与者
Paradoxes in Social Networks with Multiple Products
摘要：
最近，我们在arXiv：1105.2434中引入了一个在具有多个产品的社交网络中采用产品的模型，其中代理受其邻居的影响，可以采用几个替代品中的一个。我们在这里识别和分析四种类型的悖论，可能会出现在这些网络。为此，我们使用了我们最近在arxiv：1202.2209中介绍的社交网络游戏。这些悖论揭示了当一个人修改形成社会网络的代理人可用的产品集时可能产生的低效率。其中一个悖论对应于拥塞博弈中著名的Braess悖论，表明通过向节点添加更多的选择，网络可能最终处于对每个人都更糟的情况。我们展示了一个双重版本，从某人那里删除可用的选择最终可以使每个人都更好。我们发现的其他悖论表明，从某个节点的选择集中添加或删除一个产品可能会导致永久的不稳定性。最后，我们还确定了条件下，其中一些悖论不会出现。
英文摘要：
Recently, we introduced in arXiv:1105.2434 a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives. We identify and analyze here four types of paradoxes that can arise in these networks. To this end, we use social network games that we recently introduced in arxiv:1202.2209. These paradoxes shed light on possible inefficiencies arising when one modifies the sets of products available to the agents forming a social network. One of the paradoxes corresponds to the well-known Braess paradox in congestion games and shows that by adding more choices to a node, the network may end up in a situation that is worse for everybody. We exhibit a dual version of this, where removing available choices from someone can eventually make everybody better off. The other paradoxes that we identify show that by adding or removing a product from the choice set of some node may lead to permanent instability. Finally, we also identify conditions under which some of these paradoxes cannot arise.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
