社会选择的平滑可能性
The Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice
摘要:
我们开发了一个框架,利用Spielman和Teng的平滑复杂性分析来规避社会选择中的悖论和不可能性定理,其动机是由AI和ML驱动的社会选择的现代应用。对于孔德罗塞悖论,我们证明了平滑的可能性的悖论要么消失在一个指数的代理数量的增加,或不消失。对于同时满足匿名性、中立性和可解性的投票规则不存在的ANR不可能性,我们刻画了不可能性消失的速率,即多项式快速或指数快速。我们还提出了一种新的易于计算的平局打破机制,最佳地保持匿名性和中立性,甚至在自然环境中的替代品。我们的研究结果说明了社会选择的平滑可能性-即使悖论和不可能定理在最坏的情况下成立,它们在实践中可能不是一个大问题。
英文摘要:
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For Condrocet's paradox, we prove that the smoothed likelihood of the paradox either vanishes at an exponential rate as the number of agents increases, or does not vanish at all. For the ANR impossibility on the non-existence of voting rules that simultaneously satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and resolvability, we characterize the rate for the impossibility to vanish, to be either polynomially fast or exponentially fast. We also propose a novel easy-to-compute tie-breaking mechanism that optimally preserves anonymity and neutrality for even number of alternatives in natural settings. Our results illustrate the smoothed possibility of social choice -- even though the paradox and the impossibility theorem hold in the worst case, they may not be a big concern in practice.
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