具有内容异质性的生产和网络形成博弈
Production and Network Formation Games with Content Heterogeneity
摘要:
在线社交网络(例如Facebook、Twitter、Youtube)为共享用户生成的内容提供了流行的、具有成本效益的和可扩展的框架。本文讨论了内在的激励问题,居住在社交网络使用博弈论模型,个人用户自私的交易成本形成的链接(即他们互动)和生产的内容,个人对这样做的潜在回报。从不同用户产生的内容完全可替代的假设出发,我们明确考虑用户产生的内容的异质性,并研究它如何影响用户的行为和社交网络的结构。在给定内容异质性的情况下,我们严格证明了当社交网络的人口足够大时,每个(严格)非合作均衡应该由对称网络拓扑组成,其中每个用户产生相同数量的内容并具有相同的度,或者两级分层拓扑,所有用户属于两种类型之一:产生大量内容的影响者和产生少量内容并从影响者获得其大部分内容的订户。与此同时,少数法则在这样的网络中消失了。此外,我们证明了社会最优总是由对称拓扑的网络实现的,其中用户的效用之和最大化。为了给用户提供生产和相互分享社会最优数量的内容的激励,提出了一种定价方案,我们表明,社会最优可以实现作为一个非合作的均衡与内容获取和链接形成的定价。
英文摘要:
Online social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube) provide a popular, cost-effective and scalable framework for sharing user-generated contents. This paper addresses the intrinsic incentive problems residing in social networks using a game-theoretic model where individual users selfishly trade off the costs of forming links (i.e. whom they interact with) and producing contents personally against the potential rewards from doing so. Departing from the assumption that contents produced by difference users is perfectly substitutable, we explicitly consider heterogeneity in user-generated contents and study how it influences users' behavior and the structure of social networks. Given content heterogeneity, we rigorously prove that when the population of a social network is sufficiently large, every (strict) non-cooperative equilibrium should consist of either a symmetric network topology where each user produces the same amount of content and has the same degree, or a two-level hierarchical topology with all users belonging to either of the two types: influencers who produce large amounts of contents and subscribers who produce small amounts of contents and get most of their contents from influencers. Meanwhile, the law of the few disappears in such networks. Moreover, we prove that the social optimum is always achieved by networks with symmetric topologies, where the sum of users' utilities is maximized. To provide users with incentives for producing and mutually sharing the socially optimal amount of contents, a pricing scheme is proposed, with which we show that the social optimum can be achieved as a non-cooperative equilibrium with the pricing of content acquisition and link formation.
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