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arXiv 1211.0709cs.SIphysics.soc-ph
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攻击鲁棒恐怖网络的整形操作

Shaping Operations to Attack Robust Terror Networks

Devon Callahan, Paulo Shakarian, Jeffrey Nielsen, Anthony N. Johnson

摘要:

安全组织经常试图通过瞄准“高价值目标”(HVT)来破坏恐怖或叛乱网络。然而,有许多例子表明,这种网络如何能够在这种行动后迅速重新产生领导力。在这里,我们介绍了一个“塑造”操作的概念,其中的恐怖主义网络是第一次有针对性的目的,以减少其领导再生能力,然后再针对高价值目标的。我们希望通过删除节点来最大化网络范围的度中心性来进行整形。我们正式定义了这个问题,并证明了解决它是NP完全的。我们引入了一个混合整数线性规划,解决了这个问题,以及贪婪的启发式更实际的使用。我们实施了贪婪启发式,并在检查五个真实世界的恐怖分子网络时发现,仅删除12%的节点就可以将网络范围的中心度提高17%至45%。我们还表明,我们的算法可以扩展到大型社交网络的1,133个节点和5,541条边的商品硬件。

英文摘要:

Security organizations often attempt to disrupt terror or insurgent networks by targeting "high value targets" (HVT's). However, there have been numerous examples that illustrate how such networks are able to quickly re-generate leadership after such an operation. Here, we introduce the notion of a "shaping" operation in which the terrorist network is first targeted for the purpose of reducing its leadership re-generation ability before targeting HVT's. We look to conduct shaping by maximizing the network-wide degree centrality through node removal. We formally define this problem and prove solving it is NP-Complete. We introduce a mixed integer-linear program that solves this problem exactly as well as a greedy heuristic for more practical use. We implement the greedy heuristic and found in examining five real-world terrorist networks that removing only 12% of nodes can increase the network-wide centrality between 17% and 45%. We also show our algorithm can scale to large social networks of 1,133 nodes and 5,541 edges on commodity hardware.

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