噪声信道下的Nash码
Nash Codes for Noisy Channels
摘要:
本文研究了处理传输错误的通信协议的稳定性。我们考虑一个协调博弈之间的通知发送者和一个不知情的决策者,接收者,谁在一个嘈杂的信道进行通信。发送者的策略,称为代码,将自然状态映射到信号。接收器的最佳响应是将接收到的信道输出解码为具有最高预期接收器回报的状态。如果发送者按照规定对每个状态进行编码,那么就产生了均衡或“纳什码”。我们证明了两个定理,给出了纳什码的充分条件。首先,接收方最优码定义了纳什码。第二个,更令人惊讶的观察适用于在二进制信道上的通信,该信道被独立地使用多次,这是信息传输的基本模型:在解码时打破联系的最小“单调性”要求下,一般来说,每个代码都是纳什码。
英文摘要:
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observation holds for communication over a binary channel which is used independently a number of times, a basic model of information transmission: Under a minimal "monotonicity" requirement for breaking ties when decoding, which holds generically, EVERY code is a Nash code.
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