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arXiv 1202.0884cs.CR
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网络安全中的网络保险:信息不对称问题的探讨

Cyber-Insurance in Internet Security: A Dig into the Information Asymmetry Problem

Ranjan Pal

摘要:

互联网用户,如个人和组织,受到不同类型的流行病风险,如蠕虫,病毒,垃圾邮件和僵尸网络。为了降低风险的可能性,互联网用户通常投资于传统的安全机制,如防病毒和反垃圾邮件软件,有时也称为\emph{self-defense}机制。然而,根据安全专家的说法,这种软件(及其后续的改进)并不能完全消除风险。最近的研究工作考虑了剩余风险消除的问题,提出了\emph{cyber-insurance}的想法。在这方面,一个重要的研究问题是解决与网络保险合同相关的信息不对称问题。在本文中,我们提出了\emph{three}机制,以解决信息不对称的网络保险。我们的机制是基于微观经济理论中的\emph{Principal-Agent}(PA)模型。我们发现:(1)最优网络保险合同诱导我们的机制只提供部分覆盖的被保险人。这确保了后者为保护其计算系统而做出更大的自卫努力,这反过来又提高了整体网络安全性,(2)每个网络用户合同的免赔额水平随着用户的拓扑程度以凹进的方式增加,以及(3)在有效的机制设计下,可以使网络保险市场在存在垄断保险公司的情况下存在。我们的方法是适用于任何分布式网络的情况下,网络保险的框架可以实现。

英文摘要:

Internet users such as individuals and organizations are subject to different types of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, spams, and botnets. To reduce the probability of risk, an Internet user generally invests in traditional security mechanisms like anti-virus and anti-spam software, sometimes also known as \emph{self-defense} mechanisms. However, according to security experts, such software (and their subsequent advancements) will not completely eliminate risk. Recent research efforts have considered the problem of residual risk elimination by proposing the idea of \emph{cyber-insurance}. In this regard, an important research problem is resolving information asymmetry issues associated with cyber-insurance contracts. In this paper we propose \emph{three} mechanisms to resolve information asymmetry in cyber-insurance. Our mechanisms are based on the \emph{Principal-Agent} (PA) model in microeconomic theory. We show that (1) optimal cyber-insurance contracts induced by our mechanisms only provide partial coverage to the insureds. This ensures greater self-defense efforts on the part of the latter to protect their computing systems, which in turn increases overall network security, (2) the level of deductible per network user contract increases in a concave manner with the topological degree of the user, and (3) a market for cyber-insurance can be made to exist in the presence of monopolistic insurers under effective mechanism design. Our methodology is applicable to any distributed network scenario in which a framework for cyber-insurance can be implemented.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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