有限观测信息交换系统的社会规范设计
Social Norm Design for Information Exchange Systems with Limited Observations
摘要:
信息交换系统在许多方面有所不同,但都有一个共同的弱点,即自私行为和搭便车。在本文中,我们建立基于社会规范的激励计划。社会规范为系统中的用户规定了一种社会策略,以遵循和部署声誉计划,根据用户的行为来奖励或惩罚用户。由于这些系统中的用户通常只有有限的能力来观察全局系统信息,例如参与系统的用户的信誉分布,因此他们关于信誉分布的信念是异构的和有偏见的。这样的信念异质性导致一个积极的一部分用户不遵循的社会战略。在这种实际情况下,经济学文献中部署的标准均衡分析不再直接适用,因此,系统设计需要考虑这些差异。为了研究当参与的用户只有有限的观察时系统设计需要如何改变,我们专注于一个简单的社会规范与二元声誉标签,但允许通过随机化来调整惩罚的严重程度。首先,我们使用一个合适的贝叶斯信念函数的信念异质性建模。接下来,我们形式化的用户的最优决策问题,并得出在哪些情况下,他们遵循规定的社会战略。有了这个结果,我们然后研究系统动力学,并正式定义平衡的意义上说,系统是稳定的,当用户战略优化他们的决策。通过严格研究用户的信念分布是常数或受真实声誉分布的线性影响的两种具体情况,我们证明了最优的声誉更新规则是选择最温和的可能的惩罚。这一结果进一步证实了更高阶的信念在模拟。
英文摘要:
Information exchange systems differ in many ways, but all share a common vulnerability to selfish behavior and free-riding. In this paper, we build incentives schemes based on social norms. Social norms prescribe a social strategy for the users in the system to follow and deploy reputation schemes to reward or penalize users depending on their behaviors. Because users in these systems often have only limited capability to observe the global system information, e.g. the reputation distribution of the users participating in the system, their beliefs about the reputation distribution are heterogeneous and biased. Such belief heterogeneity causes a positive fraction of users to not follow the social strategy. In such practical scenarios, the standard equilibrium analysis deployed in the economics literature is no longer directly applicable and hence, the system design needs to consider these differences. To investigate how the system designs need to change when the participating users have only limited observations, we focus on a simple social norm with binary reputation labels but allow adjusting the punishment severity through randomization. First, we model the belief heterogeneity using a suitable Bayesian belief function. Next, we formalize the users' optimal decision problems and derive in which scenarios they follow the prescribed social strategy. With this result, we then study the system dynamics and formally define equilibrium in the sense that the system is stable when users strategically optimize their decisions. By rigorously studying two specific cases where users' belief distribution is constant or is linearly influenced by the true reputation distribution, we prove that the optimal reputation update rule is to choose the mildest possible punishment. This result is further confirmed for higher order beliefs in simulations.
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