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arXiv 1111.3013cs.CR
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信息隐藏的形式化方法:交互系统分析、统计披露控制和规范细化

Formal approaches to information hiding: An analysis of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications

Mário S. Alvim

摘要:

在这篇论文中,我们考虑的问题,信息隐藏的情况下,交互式系统,统计披露控制,细化的规格。在前两种情况下,我们采用定量的方法来信息流,我们提出了改进通常的解决方案的基础上的过程等效的第三种情况。在第一种情况下,我们考虑的问题,定义在交互式系统中的秘密和可观的信息泄漏可以交替在计算过程中,并相互影响。我们表明,信息理论的方法,解释这样的系统(简单)嘈杂的渠道是无效的。如果我们考虑具有记忆和反馈的通道,则可以恢复该原理。我们还建议使用直接信息从输入到输出的泄漏在交互式系统中的真正措施。在第二种情况下,我们考虑的问题,统计披露控制,这涉及到如何揭示一组受访者的准确统计数据,同时保护个人的隐私。我们专注于差分隐私的概念,这一概念已成为非常流行的数据库社区。我们展示了如何建模的查询系统中的信息理论通道,我们比较的概念差分隐私的最小熵leake.In第三种情况下,我们解决的问题,使用过程等价的信息隐藏特性的特征。我们表明,在非确定性的存在下,这种方法可能依赖于假设的调度程序“工作的协议的好处”,这往往不是一个安全的假设。我们提出了一种形式主义,在其中我们可以指定允许的隐藏者,相应地,完整的跟踪等价和互模拟的安全版本,我们表明,安全等价可以用来建立信息隐藏属性。

英文摘要:

In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two cases, and we propose improvements for the usual solutions based on process equivalences for the third case. In the first scenario we consider the problem of defining the information leakage in interactive systems where secrets and observables can alternate during the computation and influence each other. We show that the information-theoretic approach which interprets such systems as (simple) noisy channels is not valid. The principle can be recovered if we consider channels with memory and feedback. We also propose the use of directed information from input to output as the real measure of leakage in interactive systems. In the second scenario we consider the problem of statistical disclosure control, which concerns how to reveal accurate statistics about a set of respondents while preserving the privacy of individuals. We focus on the concept of differential privacy, a notion that has become very popular in the database community. We show how to model the query system in terms of an information-theoretic channel, and we compare the notion of differential privacy with that of min-entropy leakage.In the third scenario we address the problem of using process equivalences to characterize information-hiding properties. We show that, in the presence of nondeterminism, this approach may rely on the assumption that the scheduler "works for the benefit of the protocol", and this is often not a safe assumption. We present a formalism in which we can specify admissible schedulers and, correspondingly, safe versions of complete-trace equivalence and bisimulation, and we show that safe equivalences can be used to establish information-hiding properties.

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