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arXiv 2604.10271cs.CRcs.CLcs.IR
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窃取文本遗产:通过同形替代隐藏人类签名

Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution

Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Mississippi State University(计算机科学与工程系,密苏里州立大学)

Robert Dilworth

AI总结:

本文研究通过同形替代技术削弱 stylometry 系统,探讨如何在文本中隐藏个人身份信息以防止身份泄露。

摘要:

在政府颁发的身份证件如护照、驾照等数据泄露事件中,其影响似乎比在非显眼的社交媒体平台上自愿披露数据更为严重。然而,后者场景中通过在线帖子可能揭示作者的年龄范围和地理位置。本文探讨通过同形替代(将字符替换为视觉相似的替代品)来降低 stylometry 系统的识别能力,从而防止个人身份信息从文本中泄露。

英文摘要:

In what way could a data breach involving government-issued IDs such as passports, driver's licenses, etc., rival a random voluntary disclosure on a nondescript social-media platform? At first glance, the former appears more significant, and that is a valid assessment. The disclosed data could contain an individual's date of birth and address; for all intents and purposes, a leak of that data would be disastrous. Given the threat, the latter scenario involving an innocuous online post seems comparatively harmless -- or does it? From that post and others like it, a forensic linguist could stylometrically uncover equivalent pieces of information, estimating an age range for the author (adolescent or adult) and narrowing down their geographical location (specific country). While not an exact science -- the determinations are statistical -- stylometry can reveal comparable, though noticeably diluted, information about an individual. To prevent an ID from being breached, simply sharing it as little as possible suffices. Preventing the leakage of personal information from written text requires a more complex solution: adversarial stylometry. In this paper, we explore how performing homoglyph substitution -- the replacement of characters with visually similar alternatives (e.g., "h" $\texttt{[U+0068]}$ $\rightarrow$ "h" $\texttt{[U+04BB]}$) -- on text can degrade stylometric systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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