第1001章空间逆转攻击
Reversed Space Attacks
摘要:
许多量子密钥分发(QKD)方案都是基于发送和测量量子比特的二维量子系统。然而,在实际实现和实验中,接收器(Bob)位置处的测量设备通常不测量二维系统,而是测量更大维度的量子空间。这种扩大有时是由于设备不完善造成的。然而,在各种QKD协议中,即使在假设所有设备都是完美的理想场景中,也存在这种放大。例如,在通过光子实现的QKD方案中,这个问题很常见,其中各方的设备基于马赫-曾德尔干涉仪,因为这些干涉仪本质上扩大了使用中的量子空间。我们展示了如何在鲍勃的网站上的空间扩大暴露的实施协议的新类型的攻击,攻击尚未明确查明,也没有严格的分析。我们称之为“反向空间攻击”。在形式化我们的攻击的一个关键见解,是采取所有状态定义鲍勃的(大)测量空间和扭转他们的时间,以准确地识别空间,窃听者可能会攻击的想法。我们对最近由几个小组实验的基于干涉测量的QKD的两种变体进行了这种攻击,并展示了如何获得Alice发送的量子比特的全部信息,同时不会引起任何错误。我们在这里开发的技术随后被用于密切相关的工作(Boyer,Gelles和Mor,Physical Review A,2014),以证明对基于干涉和基于偏振的QKD的(较弱的变体)反向空间攻击。
英文摘要:
Many quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes are based on sending and measuring qubits -- two-dimensional quantum systems. Yet, in practical realizations and experiments, the measuring devices at the receiver's (Bob) site commonly do not measure a two-dimensional system but rather a quantum space of a larger dimension. Such an enlargement sometimes results from imperfect devices. However, in various QKD protocols such enlargement exists even in the ideal scenario when all devices are assumed to be perfect. This issue is common, for instance, in QKD schemes implemented via photons, where the parties' devices are based on Mach-Zehnder interferometers, as these inherently enlarge the quantum space in use. We show how space enlargement at Bob's site exposes the implemented protocol to new kinds of attacks, attacks that have not yet been explicitly pinpointed nor rigorously analyzed. We name these the "reversed space attacks". A key insight in formalizing our attacks, is the idea of taking all states defining Bob's (large) measured space and reversing them in time in order to identify precisely the space that an eavesdropper may attack. We employ such attacks on two variants of intereferometric-based QKD recently experimented by several groups, and show how to get full information on the qubit sent by Alice, while inducing no errors at all. The technique we develop here has subsequently been used in a closely related work (Boyer, Gelles, and Mor, Physical Review A, 2014) to demonstrate a (weaker variant of) reversed-space attack on both interferometric-based and polarization-based QKD.
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