分布式系统的组合博弈：EU Grant博弈
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games
摘要：
我们分析了人们在分布式系统中分解成组的方式。我们感兴趣的系统中，一个代理可以通过连接到其他代理增加其效用，但也必须支付的成本，增加了系统的大小。适当的平衡是由适当规模的代理人群体实现的。我们制定和分析了三个直观和现实的游戏，并显示如何简单的变化，在协议可以显着提高这些游戏的无政府状态无政府代价。特别是，我们确定了无政府状态的低无政府代价的两个重要属性：加入系统的协议，以及从系统中上诉拒绝的可能性。我们表明，后者的财产是特别重要的，如果有一些预先存在的约束，关于谁可以合作（或通信）与谁。
英文摘要：
We analyze ways by which people decompose into groups in distributed systems. We are interested in systems in which an agent can increase its utility by connecting to other agents, but must also pay a cost that increases with the size of the sys- tem. The right balance is achieved by the right size group of agents. We formulate and analyze three intuitive and realistic games and show how simple changes in the protocol can dras- tically improve the price of anarchy of these games. In partic- ular, we identify two important properties for a low price of anarchy: agreement in joining the system, and the possibil- ity of appealing a rejection from a system. We show that the latter property is especially important if there are some pre- existing constraints regarding who may collaborate (or com- municate) with whom.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
