被动网络演化促进复杂网络中的群体福利
Passive network evolution promotes group welfare in complex networks
摘要：
Parrondo悖论是一种违反直觉的现象，其中个别失败的策略，规范地称为游戏A和游戏B，结合起来产生获胜的结果。本文采用博弈动力学和网络结构的协同进化方法研究多智能体动力学中的适应性和生存性问题。该模型包括行动A，代表网络上的重新布线过程，和两个分支的游戏B，代表代理之间的再分配的相互作用。模拟结果表明，随机混合行动A和游戏B可以产生增强，甚至获胜的结果，尽管游戏B是单独失去。换句话说，可以实现Parrondo类型的悖论，但与典型变体不同，搅动的来源是被动的网络进化而不是主动的第二个游戏。分析了潜在的矛盾机制，揭示了重新布线过程驱动拓扑结构从初始规则格向无标度特征转变，并使剥削行为能够增强对游戏B有利分支的访问。
英文摘要：
The Parrondo's paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon in which individually losing strategies, canonically termed game A and game B, are combined to produce winning outcomes. In this paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and network structure is adopted to study adaptability and survivability in multi-agent dynamics. The model includes action A, representing a rewiring process on the network, and a two-branch game B, representing redistributive interactions between agents. Simulation results indicate that stochastically mixing action A and game B can produce enhanced, and even winning outcomes, despite gameB being individually losing. In other words, a Parrondo-type paradox can be achieved, but unlike canonical variants, the source of agitation is provided by passive network evolution instead of an active second game. The underlying paradoxical mechanism is analyzed, revealing that the rewiring process drives a topology shift from initial regular lattices towards scale-free characteristics, and enables exploitative behavior that grants enhanced access to the favourable branch of game B.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
