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arXiv 1105.1814physics.soc-phq-fin.GNquant-ph
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Ellsberg Parkinson的情境风险模型

A Contextual Risk Model for the Ellsberg Paradox

Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo

摘要:

Allais和Ellsberg悖论表明,预期效用假设和Savage的确定性原则在现实生活中是违反的。流行的解释是“模糊厌恶”,但并不完全被接受。另一方面,我们最近引入了“背景风险”的概念,以数学方式捕捉经济学文献中所谓的“模糊性”。背景风险发生的情况下,不能建模的柯尔莫哥洛夫经典的概率结构,但一个非柯尔莫哥洛夫框架与量子结构是必要的。在本文中,我们证明了上下文风险的方法可以适用于埃尔斯伯格悖论,并阐述了一个“球体模型”在我们的“隐藏的测量形式主义”,它揭示了它是整体的概念景观,负责实际的人类决策和预期效用理论的预测之间的分歧,这产生了悖论。这一结果表明,在人类思维中存在一个“量子概念层”,它与通常假定的“经典逻辑层”相叠加。

英文摘要:

The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of 'contextual risk' to mathematically capture what is known as 'ambiguity' in the economics literature. Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a 'sphere model' within our 'hidden measurement formalism' which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a 'quantum conceptual layer' in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed 'classical logical layer'.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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