埃尔斯伯格悖论的量子认知分析
A Quantum Cognition Analysis of the Ellsberg Paradox
摘要:
“期望效用假设”是古典经济学和决策理论的基础之一,萨维奇的“确定性原理”是其中的一个基本要素。有人提出,现实生活中存在着“阿莱悖论”和“埃尔斯伯格悖论",其中确定性原理被违反,而期望效用假设也不成立。我们最近提出了强有力的论据,在人类思想中存在一个双层结构,一个“经典逻辑”和一个“量子概念”,量子概念模式是上述违反的原因。我们认为,在本文中的埃尔斯伯格悖论,进行实验,真正的测试对象的情况下考虑埃尔斯伯格,并使用收集到的数据来阐述一个模型的概念景观周围的决定情况的悖论。我们表明,这是概念景观,导致违反的确定性原则,并导致了自相矛盾的情况下发现的埃尔斯伯格。
英文摘要:
The 'expected utility hypothesis' is one of the foundations of classical approaches to economics and decision theory and Savage's 'Sure-Thing Principle' is a fundamental element of it. It has been put forward that real-life situations exist, illustrated by the 'Allais' and 'Ellsberg paradoxes', in which the Sure-Thing Principle is violated, and where also the expected utility hypothesis does not hold. We have recently presented strong arguments for the presence of a double layer structure, a 'classical logical' and a 'quantum conceptual', in human thought and that the quantum conceptual mode is responsible of the above violation. We consider in this paper the Ellsberg paradox, perform an experiment with real test subjects on the situation considered by Ellsberg, and use the collected data to elaborate a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the paradox. We show that it is the conceptual landscape which gives rise to a violation of the Sure-Thing Principle and leads to the paradoxical situation discovered by Ellsberg.
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